OEIGIN OF THE DOCTKINE OF EVOLUTION. 135 



tion, is traceable through successive stages. It may be seen 

 in the last paragraph of an essay on &quot;The Philosophy of 

 Style,&quot; published in October, 1852; again in an essay on 

 &quot;Manners and Fashion,&quot; published in April, 1854; and 

 then, in a comparatively advanced form, in an essay on 

 &quot;Progess: its Law and Cause,&quot; published in April, 1857. 

 Afterwards, there came the recognition of the need for 

 further limitation of this formula ; next the inquiry into 

 those general laws of force from which this universal trans 

 formation necessarily results ; next the deduction of these 

 from the ultimate law of the persistence of force ; next the 

 perception that there is everywhere a process of Dissolution 

 complementary to that of Evolution ; and, finally, the deter 

 mination of the conditions (specified in the foregoing essay) 

 under which Evolution and Dissolution respectively occur. 

 The filiation of these results, is, I think, tolerably manifest. 

 The process has been one of continuous development, set up 

 by the addition of Von Baer s law to a number of ideas that 

 were in harmony with it. And I am not conscious of any 

 other influences by which the process has been affected. 



It is possible, however, that there may have been influences 

 of which I am not conscious ; and my opposition to M. 

 Comte s system may have been one of them. The presenta 

 tion of antagonistic thoughts, often produces greater definite- 

 ness and development of one s own thoughts. It is probable 

 that the doctrines set forth in the essay on &quot; The Genesis of 

 Science,&quot; might never have been reached, had not my very 

 decided dissent from M. Comte s conception led me to work 

 them out ; and but for this, I might not have arrived at the 

 classification of the sciences exhibited in the foregoing essay. 

 Very possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of 

 repugnance to M. Comte s views, may have aided in elaborat 

 ing my own views ; though I cannot call to mind any other 

 cases. 



Let it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that 

 I do not regard M. Comte s speculations as of great value. 



