Promise and Performance 125 



tion of morality. The other side is that no man 

 should be held excusable if he does not perform what 

 he promises, unless for the best and most sufficient 

 reason. This should be especially true of every poli 

 tician. It shows a thoroughly unhealthy state of 

 mind when the public pardons with a laugh failure 

 to keep a distinct pledge, on the ground that a poli 

 tician can not be expected to confine himself to the 

 truth when on the stump or the platform. A man 

 should no more be excused for lying on the stump 

 than for lying off the stump. Of course matters 

 may so change that it may be impossible for him, or 

 highly inadvisable for the country, that he should 

 try to do what he in good faith said he was going 

 to do. But the necessity for the change should be 

 made very evident, and it should be well understood 

 that such a case is the exception and not the rule. As 

 a rule, and speaking with due regard to the excep 

 tions, it should be taken as axiomatic that when a 

 man in public life pledges himself to a certain course 

 of action he shall as a matter of course do what he 

 said he would do, and shall not be held to have acted 

 honorably if he does otherwise. 



All great fundamental truths are apt to sound 

 rather trite, and yet in spite of their triteness they 

 need to be reiterated over and over again. The 

 visionary or the self-seeking knave who promises 

 the golden impossible, and the credulous dupe who is 



