The Winning of the West 



backwoodsmen into a frenzy. There was never any 

 real danger that Jay's proposition would be adopted ; 

 but the Westerners did not know this. In all the 

 considerable settlements on the Western waters, 

 committees of correspondence were elected to remon 

 strate and petition Congress against any agreement 

 to close the Mississippi. 25 Even those who had no 

 sympathy with the separatist movement warned 

 Congress that if any such agreement were entered 

 into it would probably entail the loss of the West 

 ern country. 26 



There was justification for the original excite 

 ment; there was none whatever for its continuance 

 after Jay's final report to Congress, in April, 1 787, 27 

 and after the publication by Congress of its resolve 

 never to abandon its claim to the Mississippi. Jay 

 in this report took what was unquestionably the ra 

 tional position. He urged that the United States 

 was undoubtedly in the right; and that it should 

 either insist upon a treaty with Spain, by which all 

 conflicting claims would be reconciled, or else 

 simply claim the right, and if Spain refused to grant 

 it promptly declare war. 



So far he was emphatically right. His cool and 

 steadfast insistence on our rights, and his clear 

 sighted recognition of the proper way to obtain 

 them, contrasted well with the mixed turbulence 



u Madison MSS. Letter of Caleb Wallace, Nov. 12, 1787. 



State Dept. MSS., No. 56. Symmes to the President of 

 Congress, May 3, 1787. 



51 W. H. Trescott, "Diplomatic History of the Administra 

 tions of Washington and Adams," p. 46. 



