PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION 



1 ORIGINALLY intended to write a companion 

 volume to this, which should deal with the oper 

 ations on land. But a short examination showed 

 that these operations were hardly worth serious 

 study. They teach nothing new ; it is the old, old 

 lesson, that a miserly economy in preparation may 

 in the end involve a lavish outlay of men and money, 

 which, after all, comes too late to more than partially 

 offset the evils produced by the original short-sighted 

 parsimony. This might be a lesson worth dwelling 

 on did it have any practical bearing on the issues 

 of the present day; but it has none, as far as the 

 army is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jeffer 

 son, and his follower, Madison, to neglect to give 

 us a force either of regulars or of well-trained vol 

 unteers during the twelve years they had in which 

 to prepare for the struggle that any one might see 

 was inevitable; but there is now far less need of an 

 army than there was then. Circumstances have al 

 tered widely since 1812. Instead of the decaying 

 might of Spain on our Southern frontier, we have 

 the still weaker power of Mexico. Instead of the 

 great Indian nations of the interior, able to keep 

 civilization at bay, to hold in check strong armies, 



(7) 



