Introductory 37 



the rest of the war that the militia, hitherto worse 

 than useless, should on this occasion win against 

 great odds in point of numbers ; and, moreover, that 

 their splendid victory should have been of little con 

 sequence in its effects upon the result. On the whole, 

 the contest by land, where we certainly ought to 

 have been successful, reflected greater credit on our 

 antagonists than upon us, in spite of the services of 

 Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small force of 

 regulars and volunteers did excellently ; as for the 

 militia, New Orleans proved that they could fight 

 superbly; and the other battles that they generally 

 would not fight at all. 



At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were 

 widely different. Here we possessed a small but 

 highly effective force, the ships well built, manned 

 by thoroughly trained men, and commanded by able 

 and experienced officers. The deeds of our navy 

 form a part of history over which any American can 

 be pardoned for lingering. 



Such was the origin, issue, and general character 

 of the war. It may now be well to proceed to a 

 comparison of the authorities on the subject. Allu 

 sion has already been made to them in the preface, 

 but a fuller reference seems to be necessary in this 

 connection. 



At the close of the contest, the large majority of 

 historians who wrote of it were so bitterly ran 

 corous that their statements must be received with 

 caution. For the main facts I have relied wherever 



