Introductory 47 



says (p. 155) that of the American sailors one-third 

 in number and one-half in point of effectiveness were 

 in reality British. That is, of the 450 men the Con 

 stitution had when she fought the Java 150 were 

 British, and the remaining 300 could have been as 

 effectively replaced by 150 more British. So a very 

 little logic works out a result that James certainly 

 did not intend to arrive at ; namely, that 300 British 

 led by American officers could beat, with ease and 

 comparative impunity, 400 British led by their own 

 officers. He also forgets that the whole consists of 

 the sum of the parts. He accounts for the victories 

 of the Americans by stating (p. 280) that they were 

 lucky enough to meet with frigates and brigs who 

 had unskilful gunners or worthless crews; he also 

 carefully shows that the Macedonian was incompe 

 tently handled, the Peacock commanded by a mere 

 martinet, the Avon's crew unpracticed at the guns, 

 the Epervier's mutinous and cowardly, the Pen 

 guin's weak and unskilful, the Java's exceedingly 

 poor, and more to the same effect. Now the Amer 

 icans took in single fight three frigates and seven 

 sloops, and when as many as ten vessels are met 

 it is exceedingly probable that they represent the fair 

 average; so that James' strictures, so far as true, 

 simply show that the average British ship was very 

 apt to possess, comparatively speaking, an incompe 

 tent captain or unskilful crew. These disadvantages 

 were not felt when opposed to navies in which they 

 existed to an even greater extent, but became very 

 apparent when brought into contact with a power 



