On the Ocean 233 



turn (not in loss but in damage) than they did. 

 The Chesapeake was a better fighter than either the 

 Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian, and could have 

 captured any one of them. The Shannon of course 

 did less damage than any of the American 44*5, 

 probably just about in the proportion of the differ 

 ence in force. 



Almost all American writers have treated the 

 capture of the Chesapeake as if it was due simply 

 to a succession of unfortunate accidents; for ex 

 ample, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism, 

 says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its 

 short duration, are "altogether the results of the 

 chances of war," and that it was mainly decided by 

 "fortuitous events as unconnected with any particu 

 lar merit on the one side as they are with any 

 particular demerit on the other." 29 Most naval 

 men consider it a species of treason to regard the 

 defeat as due to anything but extraordinary ill 

 fortune. And yet no disinterested reader can help 

 acknowledging that the true reason of the defeat 

 was the very simple one that the Shannon fought 

 better than the Chesapeake. It has often been said 

 that up to the moment when the ships came to 

 gether the loss and damage suffered by each were 



99 The worth of such an explanation is very aptly gauged 

 in General Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClel- 

 lan's Campaign of 1862" (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he 

 speaks of "those unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which 

 are vaguely described as the 'fortune of war, 1 but which usu 

 ally prove to be the superior ability or resources of the an 

 tagonist." 



