On the Lakes 289 



it is to run away with the balance, in hopes that the 

 enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, 

 Sir James would have been placed between two fires, 

 and it would have been impossible for him to cap- 

 ture the schooners. As it was, the British com- 

 mander had attacked a superior force in weather 

 that had just suited it, and yet had captured two 

 of its vessels without suffering 1 any injury beyond 

 a few shot holes in the sails. The action, however, 

 was in no way decisive. All next day, the nth, the 

 fleets were in sight of one another, the British to 

 windward, but neither attempted to renew the en- 

 gagement. The wind grew heavier, and the vil- 

 lanous little American schooners showed such strong 

 tendencies to upset, that two had to run into Ni- 

 agara Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran 

 down the lake to Sackett's Harbor, which he reached 

 on the 1 3th, provisioned his squadron for five weeks, 

 and that same evening proceeded up the lake again. 

 The advantage in this action had been entirely 

 with the British, but it is simply nonsense to say, 

 as one British historian does, that "on Lake Ontario, 

 therefore, we at last secured a decisive predomi- 

 nance, which we maintained until the end of the 

 war." 20 This "decisive" battle left the Americans 

 just as much in command of the lake as the British ; 



"History of the British Navy," by Charles Duke Yonge 

 (London, 1866), iii, p. 24. It is apparently not a work of any 

 authority, but I quote it as showing probably the general 

 feeling of British writers about the action and its results, 

 which can only proceed from extreme partisanship and igno- 

 rance of the subject. 



VOL. IX. 13 



