ioo Naval War of 1812 



which tonned 1,701, was manned by 680 men, and 

 threw at a broadside 1,099 Ibs. of shot; and he de 

 clined to go out of port or in any way try to check 

 the operation of Yeo's fleet which tonned 2,091, was 

 manned by 770 men, and threw at a broadside 1,374 

 Ibs. of shot. Chauncy then acted perfectly proper, 

 no doubt, but he could not afford to sneer at Yeo 

 for behaving in the same way. Whatever either 

 commander might write, in reality he well knew that 

 his officers and crews were, man for man, just about 

 on a par with those of his antagonists, and so, after 

 the first brush or two, he was exceedingly careful 

 to see that the odds were not against him. Chauncy 

 in his petulant answers to Brown's letter ignored the 

 fact that his superiority of force would prevent his 

 opponent from giving battle, and would, therefore, 

 prevent anything more important than a blockade 

 occurring. 



His ideas of the purpose for which his command 

 had been created were erroneous and very hurtful 

 to the American cause. That purpose was not, ex 

 cept incidentally, "the destruction of the enemy's 

 fleet" ; and, if it was, he entirely failed to accomplish 

 it. The real purpose was to enable Canada to be 

 successfully invaded, or to assist in repelling an in 

 vasion of the United States. These services could 

 only be efficiently performed by acting in union with 

 the land-forces, for his independent action could evi- 



