io6 Naval War of 1812 



and able evolutions, and created success by science 

 united to prudence. . . . But these two schools 

 were true only according to circumstances, not ab 

 solutely. When two fleets of equal worth are fac 

 ing one another, as in the War of the American 

 Revolution, then tactics should come into play, and 

 audacity would often be mere foolhardiness. If it 

 happens, on the other hand, as in the Republic, or 

 during the last years of Louis XV, that an irreso 

 lute fleet, without organization, has to contend with 

 a fleet prepared in every way, then, on the part of 

 this last, audacity is wisdom and prudence would be 

 cowardice, for it would give an enemy who distrusts 

 himself time to become more hardy. The only 

 school always true is that one which, freed from 

 all routine, produces men whose genius will unite in 

 one, in knowing how to apply them appropriately, 

 the audacity which will carry off victory, and the 

 prudence which knows how to obtain it in prepar 

 ing for it." 



These generalizations are drawn from the results 

 of mighty battles, but they apply just as well to the 

 campaigns carried on on a small scale, or even to 

 single-ship actions. Chauncy, as already said, does 

 not deserve the praise which most American his 

 torians, and especially Cooper, have lavished on him 

 as well as on all our other officers of that period. 

 Such indiscriminate eulogy entirely detracts from 



