198 Naval War of 1812 



would certainly have escaped. With the exceptions 

 of the Chesapeake and Argus (both of which were 

 taken fairly, because their antagonists, though of 

 only equal force, were better fighters), the remain 

 ing loss of the Americans was due to the small 

 cruisers stumbling from time to time across the 

 path of some one of the innumerable British heavy 

 vessels. Had Congressional forethought been suf 

 ficiently great to have allowed a few line-of-battle 

 ships to have been in readiness some time previous 

 to the war, results of weight might have been ac 

 complished. But the only activity ever exhibited 

 by Congress in materially increasing the navy pre 

 vious to the war, had been in partially carrying 

 out President Jefferson's ideas of having an enor 

 mous force of very worthless gunboats a scheme 

 whose wisdom was about on a par with some of that 

 statesman's political and military theories. 



Of the twelve 88 single-ship actions, two (those of 

 the Argus and Chesapeake} undoubtedly redounded 

 most to the credit of the British, in two (that of the 



88 Not counting the last action of the Constitution, the 

 President's action, or the capture of the Essex, on account 

 of the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of credit due 

 to each side. In both the first actions, however, the Ameri 

 can ships seem to have been rather more ably fought than 

 their antagonists', and, taking into account the overwhelm 

 ing disadvantages under which the Essex labored, her de 

 fence displayed more desperate bravery than did that of any 

 other ship during the war. 



