212 Naval War of 1812 



to meet the English. Until near the end, the gen 

 erals were as bad as the armies they commanded, 

 and the administration of the War Department con 

 tinued to be a triumph of imbecility to the very last. 2 

 With the exception of the brilliant and successful 

 charge of the Kentucky mounted infantry at the 

 battle of the Thames, the only bright spot in the 

 war in the North was the campaign on the Niagara 

 frontier during the summer of 1814; and even here, 

 the chief battle, that of Lundy's Lane, though re 

 flecting as much honor on the Americans as on the 

 British, was for the former a defeat, and not a vic 

 tory, as most of our writers seem to suppose. 



But the war had a dual aspect. It was partly a 

 contest between the two branches of the English 

 race, and partly a last attempt on the part of the 

 Indian tribes to check the advance of the most rap 

 idly growing one of these same two branches; and 

 this last portion of the struggle, though attracting 

 comparatively little attention, was really much the 

 most far-reaching in its effect upon history. The 

 triumph of the British would have distinctly meant 



5 Monroe's biographer (see "James Monroe," by Daniel C. 

 Oilman. Boston, 1883, p. 123) thinks he made a good Secre 

 tary of War; I think he was as much a failure as his prede 

 cessors, and a harsher criticism could not be passed on him. 

 Like the other statesmen of his school, he was mighty in 

 word and weak in action; bold to plan but weak to perform. 

 As an instance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the 

 fact that he never gave him a particle of practical help. 



