The Battle of New Orleans 255 



approach of the British, undoubtedly saved the city ; 

 for their vanguard was so roughly handled that, 

 instead of being able to advance at once, they were 

 forced to delay three days, during which time Jack- 

 son entrenched himself in a position from which he 

 was never driven. But after this first attack the of- 

 fensive would have been not only hazardous, but 

 useless, and accordingly Jackson, adopting that 

 mode of warfare which best suited the ground he 

 was on and the troops he had under him, forced the 

 enemy always to fight him where he was strongest, 

 and confined himself strictly to the pure defensive 

 a system condemned by most European authori- 

 ties, 54 but which has at times succeeded to admira- 

 tion in America, as witness Fredericksburg, Gettys- 

 burg, Kenesaw Mountain, and Franklin. More- 

 over, it must be remembered that Jackson's success 

 was in no wise owing either to chance or to the 

 errors of his adversary. 53 As far as fortune favored 



54 Thus Napier says (v. p. 25): "Soult fared as most gen- 

 erals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of 

 numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude com- 

 manders and undisciplined soldiers, lines may avail ; seldom 

 against accomplished commanders, never when the assailants 

 are the better soldiers." And again (p. 150), "Offensive opera- 

 tions must be the basis of a good defensive system." 



" The reverse has been stated again and again with very 

 great injustice, not only by British, but even by American 

 writers (as e. g., Prof. W. G. Sumner, in his "Andrew Jack- 

 son as a Public Man," Boston, 1882). The climax of absurd- 

 ity is reached by Major McDougal, who says (as quoted by 



