SPENCER'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE INQUIRY, xxxix 



of science, present a series of vast and complex dynamical problems, 

 which are to be studied in the future in the light of the great 

 law by which, we have reason to believe, all forms and phases of 

 force aro governed. 



A further aspect of the subject remains still to be noticed. Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer has the honor of crowning this sublime inquiry by 

 showing that the law of the conservation, or as he prefers to term it 

 the ' Persistence of Force,' as it is the underlying principle of all be- 

 ing, is also the fundamental truth of all philosophy. With masterly 

 analytic skill he has shown that this principle of which the human 

 mind has just become fully conscious, is itself the profoundest law 

 of the human mind, the deepest foundation of consciousness. He 

 has demonstrated that the law of the Persistence of Force, of which 

 the most piercing intellects of past times had but partial and un- 

 satisfying glimpses, and which the latest scientific research has 

 disclosed as a great principle of nature, has a yet more transcendent 

 character ; is, in fact, an d priori truth of the highest order a 

 truth which is necessarily involved in our mental organization ; 

 which is broader than any possible induction, and of higher validity 

 than any other truth whatever. This principle, which is at once 

 the highest result of scientific investigation and metaphysical 

 analysis, Mr. Spencer has made the basis of his new and compre- 

 hensive System of Philosophy ; and in the first work of the series, 

 entitled " First Principles, " he has developed the doctrine in its 

 broadest philosophic aspects. The lucid reasoning by which he 

 reaches his conclusions cannot be presented here ; a brief extract 

 or two will, however, serve to indicate the important place assigned 

 to the law by this acute and profound inquirer : 



" We might, indeed, be certain, even in the absence of any such 

 analysis as the foregoing, that there must exist some principle 

 which, as being the basis of science, cannot be established by sci- 

 ence. All reasoned out conclusions whatever must rest on some 

 postulate. As before shown, we cannot go on merging derivative 

 truths in these wider and wider truths from which they are de- 



