414 Darwin, and after Darwin. 



whole sphere of such causation itself: therefore it lies 

 beyond any possible intrusion by science. And not 

 only so. But if the nature of natural causation be 

 that of the highest order of known existence, then, 

 although we must evidently be incapable of conceiving 

 what such a Mind is, at least we seem capable of 

 judging what in many respects it is not. It cannot 

 be more than one ; it cannot be limited either in 

 space or time ; it cannot be other than at least as 

 self-consistent as its manifestations in nature are in- 

 variable. Now, from the latter deduction there arises 

 a point of first-rate importance in the present con- 

 nexion. For if the so-called First Cause be intelligent, 

 and therefore all secondary causes but the expression 

 of a supreme Will, in as far as such a Will is self- 

 consistent, the operation of all natural causes must 

 be uniform, with the result that, as seen by us, this 

 operation must needs appear to be what we call 

 mechanical. The more unvarying the Will, the more 

 unvarying must be this expression thereof; so that, 

 if the former be absolutely self-consistent, the latter 

 cannot fail to be as reasonably interpreted by the 

 theory of mindless necessity, as by that of ubiquitous 

 intention. Such being, as it appears to me, the pure 

 logic of the matter, the proof of organic evolution 

 amounts to nothing more than the proof of a natural 

 process. What mode of being is ultimately concerned 

 in this process or in what it is that this process 

 ultimately consists is a question upon which science 

 is as voiceless as speculation is vociferous. 



But, it may still be urged, surely the principle of 

 natural selection (with its terrible basis in the struggle 

 for existence) and the principle of sexual selection 



