Introduction. 29 



as imposing limits on the powers of natural causation, 

 my criticism is as follows. 



In the first place, it is a psychological fallacy to 

 regard the so-called " faculties " of mind as analogous 

 to " organs " of the body. To classify the latter with 

 reference to the functions which they severally perform 

 is to follow a natural method of classification. But 

 it is an artificial method which seeks to partition 

 mental faculty into this, that, and the other mental 

 faculties. Like all other purely artificial classifications, 

 this one has its practical uses ; but, also like 

 them, it is destitute of philosophical meaning. This 

 statement is so well recognized by psychologists, that 

 there is no occasion to justify it. But I must remark 

 that any cogency which Mr. Wallace's argument may 

 appear to present, arises from his not having recognized 

 the fact which the statement conveys. For, had he 

 considered the mind as a whole, instead of having 

 contemplated it under the artificial categories of 

 constituent " faculties," he would probably not have 

 laid any such special stress upon some of the latter. 

 In other words, he would have seen that the general 

 development of the human mind as a whole has 

 presumably involved the growth of those conven- 

 tionally abstracted parts, which he regards as really 

 separate endowments. Or, if he should find it easier 

 to retain the terms of his metaphor, we may answer 

 him by saying that the ' faculties " of mind are 

 "correlated," like "organs" of the body; and, there- 

 fore, that any general development of the various 

 other "faculties" have presumably entailed a collateral 

 development of the two in question. 



Again, in the second place, it would seem that 



