46 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



The Imagination. 



Que d'ecueil doit craindre celui qui prend son ima- 

 gination pour guide. Prevenu pour la cause qu'elle 

 lui presente, loin de la rejeter lorsque les faits lui 

 sont contraire, il les altere pour les plier a ses hypo- 

 theses. II mutile, si je puis ainsi dire, 1'ouvrage de la 

 nature, pour le faire resembler a celui de son imagi- 

 nation, sans reflechir que le temps detruit d'une main 

 ces vaines phantoms, et de 1'autre affermit les re- 

 sultats du calcul et de Texperience. 



It is too much to expect that mere moral specula- 

 tion is to be accepted as a substitute for fact and ana- 

 logical reasoning. 



Passion. 



When we put ourselves in the attitude that any 

 passion naturally occasions, we soon, in some degree, 

 acquire that passion. Hence, when persons addicted 

 to scolding, indulge themselves in loud oaths and vio- 

 lent action with the arms, they increase their anger 

 by their mode of expressing themselves ; and, on the 

 contrary, the counterfeited smile of pleasure in dis- 

 agreeable company, soon brings along with it a por- 

 tion of the reality. 



Silence. 



It is said of Socrates, that whenever he felt the 

 passion of anger rising he became instantly silent, by 

 which effort he not only avoided many occasions of 

 giving offence, but actually killed the seeds of those 

 malignant passions, which are the bane of human 

 happiness. 



Love and Hunger. 



The human passions appear infinite, but may pro- 

 bably be all traced to two sources variously modified, 

 love and hunger, and, perhaps, fear. 



