26 FRAGMENTS OF SCIENCE 



out due examination, had come to the conclusion that 

 the order of nature was secure. 



"What we mean, he says, by our belief in the order of 

 nature, is the belief that the future will be like the past. 

 There is not, according to Mr. Mozley, the slightest ra- 

 tional basis for this belief. 



"That any cause in nature is more permanent than its existing and known 

 effects, extending further, and about to produce other and more instances 

 besides what it has produced already, we have no evidence. Let us imagine," 

 he continues, "the occurrence of a particular physical phenomenon for the first 

 time. Upon that single occurrence we should have but the very faintest ex- 

 pectation of another. If it did occur again, once or twice, so far from count- 

 ing on another occurrence, a cessation would occur as the most natural event 

 to us. But let it continue one hundred times, and we should find no hesitation 

 in inviting persons from a distance to see it; and if it occurred every day for 

 years, its occurrence would be a certainty to us, its cessation a marvel. . . . 

 "What ground of reason can we assign for an expectation that any part of the 

 course of nature will be the next moment what it has been up to this moment, 

 i.e. for our belief hi the uniformity of nature? None. No demonstrative reason 

 can be given, for the contrary to the recurrence of a fact of nature is no con- 

 tradiction. No probable reason can be given ; for all probable reasoning respect- 

 ing the course of nature is founded upon this presumption of likeness, and 

 therefore cannot be the foundation of it. No reason can be given for this belief. 

 It is without a reason. It rests upon no rational grounds, and can be traced to 

 no rational principle." 



"Everything, 11 Mr. Mozley, however, adds, "depends 

 upon this belief, every provision we make for the future, 

 every safeguard and caution we employ against it, all 

 calculation, all adjustment of means to ends, supposes this 

 belief; and yet this belief has no more producible reason 

 for it than a speculation of fancy. ... It is necessary, 

 all-important for the purposes of life, but solely practical, 

 and possesses no intellectual character. . . . The proper 

 f unction, " continues Mr. Mozley, "of the inductive prin- 

 ciple, the argument from experience, the belief in the 

 order of nature by whatever phrase we designate the same 



