SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM 95 



such there be; and were we intimately acquainted with 

 the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we 

 should be as far as ever from the solution of the prob- 

 lem, "How are these physical processes connected with 

 the facts of consciousness?" The chasm between the 

 two classes of phenomena would still remain intellect- 

 ually impassable. Let the consciousness of love, for ex- 

 ample, be associated with a right-handed spiral motion of 

 the molecules of the brain, and the consciousness of hate 

 with a left-handed spiral motion. We should then know, 

 when we love, that the motion is in one direction, and, 

 when we hate, that the motion is in the other; but the 

 "WHY?" would remain as unanswerable as before. 



In affirming that the growth of the body is mechan- 

 ical, and that thought, as exercised by us, has its cor- 

 relative in the physics of the brain, I think the position 

 of the "Materialist" is stated, as far as that position is 

 a tenable one. I think the materialist will be able finally 

 to maintain this position against all attacks; but I do not 

 think, in the present condition of the human mind, that 

 he can pass beyond this position. I do not think he is 

 entitled to say that his molecular groupings, and motions, 

 explain everything. In reality they explain nothing. 

 The utmost he can affirm is the association of two classes 

 of phenomena, of whose real bond of union he is in ab- 

 solute ignorance. The problem of the connection of body 

 and soul is as insoluble, in its modern form, as it was in 

 the pre-scientific ages. Phosphorus is known to enter 

 into the composition of the human brain, and a trench- 

 ant Q-erman writer has exclaimed, "Ohne Phosphor, kein 

 Gedanke!" That may or may not be the case; but even 

 if we knew it to be the case, the knowledge would not 



