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unconditionally. At the termination of this discussion 

 ministers intimated that they were prepared to concede the 

 question : and accordingly, on the 23rd of the same month, 

 an unconditional suspension of the orders, in so far as 

 America was concerned, appeared in the ' Gazette.' By 

 this time however the government of the United States had 

 declared war, on the ground, as is well known, not only of 

 the orders in council, but of other alleged acts of injustice 

 on^the part of the British government. 



The policy of the British government in issuing the 

 orders in council of November, 1807, was maintained by its 

 opponents to be wrong, on the double ground that it Was 

 both inexpedient and not warranted by the principles of the 

 law of nations. On this latter head it was argued that no 

 violation of international law by one belligerent power could 

 'ustify the other in pursuing a similar course. 



The question, like all others connected with the law of 

 blockade, appears to be one which must be determined 

 chiefly by a reference to the rights of neutral powers, as re- 

 gulated by the principle already stated, namely, that no 

 neutral power shall be annoyed or incommoded by any war- 

 like operation, which shall not have a greater tendency to 

 benefit the belligerent than to injure the neutral. In this 

 case the benefit which the British government professed to 

 expect from its retaliatory policy, which was the excitement 

 of a spirit of resistance to the original French decree both in 

 neutral countries and among the people of France them- 

 selves, was extremely problematical from the first, and 

 turned out eventually to be wholly delusive. On the other 

 hand, the injury to neutrals V.MS certain and of large amount, 

 tending in fact to interdict and, as far as possible, to put a stop 

 to the entire peaceful commercial intercourse of the world. 



The orders in council were sometimes defended, for want 

 of better reasons, on a very peculiar ground, namely, on that 

 nf the pecuniary advantage which the country derived from 

 the captures made under them, from the increase of port 

 dues which they occasioned, and from the revenue obtained 

 by the licensing system. 



In resting the justification of the orders in council upon 

 the ground of their expediency, their defenders of course con- 

 tended that they were essential to the effective prosecution of 

 the war, and that we wore therefore justified in disregarding 

 the injury which they might indirectly indict upon neutrals. 

 It was anticipated, as we have observed above, in the first 

 place, that the pressure of their operation would excite both 

 the American government, and even the inhabitants of 

 France themselves, and of the various countries of Europe 

 subject to the French emperor, to insist upon the revocation 

 of the Berlin decree. But the effect anticipated was not 

 produced. Neither the people of France, nor of any other 

 portion of Bonaparte's empire, rose or threatened to rise in 

 insurrection on account of the stoppage of trade occasioned 

 hy the edicts of the two belligerent powers ; and America 

 went to war, not with France, but with us, choosing to re- 

 serve the assertion of her claims for wrongs suft'ered under 

 the Berlin decree to another opportunity, while she deter- 

 mined to resist our orders in council by force of arms. But 

 secondly, it was contended that the policy adopted by the 

 orders in council was necessary to save our commerce from 

 what would otherwise have been the ruinous effects of the 

 Berlin decree. This argument, also, if its validity is to be 

 tried by the facts as they actually fell out, will scarcely ap- 

 pear to be well founded. The preponderance of the evi- 

 dence collected in the course of the successive inquiries 

 which took place was decidedly in favour of the representa- 

 tions made by the opponents of the orders, who maintained 

 that, instead of having proved any protection or support to 

 our foreign trade, they had most seriously embarrassed and 

 curtailed it. The authors of the orders themselves must 

 indeed be considered to have come over to this view of the 

 matter, when they consented, as they at length did, to their 

 entire repeal. 



In the actual circumstances of the present case, the con- 

 venient interposition of America, by means of which British 

 manufactured goods were still enabled to find their way in 

 large quantities to the continent in spite of the Berlin decree, 

 would seem to have been the last thing at which the go- 

 vernment of this country should have taken umbrage, or 

 which it should have attempted to put down. As the French 

 ruler found it expedient to tolerate this interposition, in open 

 disregard of his decree, it surely was no business of ours to 

 set ourselves to cut off a channel of exit for our merchandise, 

 to fortunately left open when nearly every other was shut. 



BLOCKADE. This consists in surrounding a fortified 

 place by a cordon of troops, in order to prevent supplies of 

 provisions or warlike stores from entering, and to compel the 

 garrison to surrender from famine or the failure of their am- 

 munition. The generality of the antient sieges were block- 

 ades, and two of the most memorable in Grecian history 

 were those of Platcea and Pydna. The former lasted two 

 years, and is remarkable for being the first of which any 

 connected details have been given. Pydna, in which city 

 Olympias had taken refuge, was closely invested by Cas- 

 sander both by sea and land, and did not surrender till the 

 garrison had suffered the utmost extremity of famine. 



When fortresses are situated on rocky eminences, whose 

 sides are steep by nature, or can be made so by human 

 labour ; when they are approachable only by narrow passes, 

 and the surrounding country is unfavourable for the execu- 

 tion of the works required in carrying on a regular siege, 

 their reduction is most conveniently effected by a blockade, 

 because they can be masked by a corps of troops not so nu- 

 merous as to diminish materially the strength of the army 

 in the field ; and their garrisons, being necessarily small, are 

 unable to attempt any serious enterprise. 



In Europe however nearly all the old fortresses of this 

 kind have been suft'ered to go to ruin, the smallness of their 

 garrisons rendering them wholly useless ; and therefore, 

 since the end of the seventeenth century, blockades have 

 been much less frequent than they were before that time. 

 During the continuance of the war which was carried 

 on by the Germans and Venetians agauist the Turks, and 

 which ended with the peace ot'Carlowitz in 1698, several 

 places were taken from the Turks after having been long 

 invested; it was thus that, in Hungary, the fort of Agria 

 and the towns of Mongatz and Great Wuradin were taken, 

 by the Imperialists, and that in the Morea, the Venetian 

 general obtained possession of Napoli cli Malvasia. 



Fortified towns may be blockaded when means are want- 

 ing to execute trenches and ricoohetting batteries ; and when 

 besides the place is known to be incompletely furnished 

 with the neiessary stores, and to contain a numerous popu- 

 lation within its walls. In such circumstances it may rea- 

 sonably be expected that the place will in time be surren- 

 dered, particularly if it be the seat of an extensive commerce, 

 or if the inhabitants should be disaffected to their govern- 

 ment. The loss occasioned by the stoppage of the usual 

 channels of trade, the discomfort arising from being confined 

 within the fortifications ; and chiefly, the distress brought 

 on by the scarcity, and consequently the high price of the- 

 necessaries of life, never fail to produce dissatisfaction and. 

 even tumults among the citizens ; and in the end the com- 

 mander of the place is generally compelled by clamour, or 

 induced by solicitation, to comply with the wishes of the 

 people and to deliver up his charge to the enemy. 



In the establishment of a blockade, the outposts of the: 

 garrison are first driven as near as possible to the place, and 

 bodies of troops consisting of one or more companies, or 

 even battalions, are disposed in convenient situations before 

 all the accessible fronts : these are also strengthened at in- 

 tervals by redoubts containing artillery, and if the place is 

 on the sea-coast, a naval armament watches it on that side. 

 Corps of cavalry and infantry are made to occupy any vil- 

 lages on the several roads by which it may be attempted to 

 throw supplies into the place ; advanced posts also, each 

 consisting of a few men, watch the town closely, and main- 

 tain the communications between the different divisions of 

 the blockading corps, by which means any movement of the 

 garrison may be immediately discovered. 



The blockading corps should also be supported by a re- 

 serve, established at a greater distance from the place ; and 

 in the event of a convoy approaching with succours for the 

 garrison, the commander of the blockading army sends for- 

 ward one or more battalions from those posts which lie 

 nearest to the road by which the convoy is to arrive. These 

 engage the convoy and prevent it from entering the place, 

 while other troops from the neighbouring posts oppose those 

 of the garrison, if the latter should make a sortie in order to 

 favour the operations of the succouring corps. 



On the other hand, in order to counteract as much as 

 possible the efforts of the enemy, all persons who cannot be 

 rendered serviceable in the defence, or who cannot lay in a 

 sufficient supply of provisions for their support during th<; 

 probable continuance of the blockade, are sent out of the 

 town ; the necessary quantities of provisions and military 

 stores are provided, and secured in casemates or shell-proof 



