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action to a considerable extent prescribed by a constitution ; 



but Talleyrand saw better than Napoleon that thu laws 



limiting DM arbitrary \\ill of the 



ruler, in turn protect li'im by teaching then legitimate 

 inothoda of defending their rights. In another t> 

 they resembled each other neither was remarkably scru- 

 pulous as to the means by winch he attained his ends; 

 though thii laxity of numd sentiment was kept in check by 

 the natural h\imanitv of both. Their ven .litl'er- 



verc calculated to cement their union. The observant 

 self-centred mind of Talleyrand was lamed by it* want of 

 power to set other- in motion : it is only through sympathy 

 that the contagious love of action can be conveved. The 

 impassioned and imaginative soul of Napoleon was made 

 to attach others to him and whirl them along with him ; 

 and this power was often too strong for itself: Napoleon, 

 though capable of reflection, was too often hurried away 

 by his instinctive impulses. Each of these men felt that 

 the other was a supplement to himself. Talleyrand really 

 admired and appreciated Xapoleon. If he flattered him, 

 it was by the delicate method of confirming him in the 

 opinions and intentions which met his approbation, lie 

 dared to tell the First Consul truths which others were afraid 

 to utter; and he ventured to arrest at times the impetuosity 

 of Napoleon, by postponing the fulfilment of his orders 

 until he had time to cool. He opposed, as long as there 

 was any prospect of success, the divorce from Josephine : 

 but his virtue gave way in the business of the Duke 

 d'Enghien, for even though we exculpate him from parti- 

 cipation in the execution of that pnnce, to gratify his 

 master he sanctioned the violation of a neutral territory. 

 This was however the only instance, in so far as Bona- 

 parte is concerned, of his sacrificing the duty of a friend 

 to flattery that can be brought home to him. Napoleon's 

 frequent recurrence, in his conversations at St. Helena, to 

 the subject of Talleyrand's defection, his attempts to solve 

 the question at what time that minister ' began to betray 

 him,' show his appreciation of the services he had re- 

 ceived from him. 



For a time their alliance continued harmonious, and that 

 was the time of Napoleon's success. The arrangement of 

 the Concordat with the pope was the basis of the future 

 empire, and that negociation was accomplished by Talley- 

 rand. The treaty of l,une\ille, secularising tl" 

 tical principalities of Germany : the treaty of Ainu 

 cognising on the part of England the conquests of ! 

 and the new form given to the Continental states by the 

 Revolution ; the convention of I.yon, which gave form to 

 the Cisalpine republic; all bear the impress of the peculiar 



- of M. de Talleyrand. And the minister of i 

 httairs was fully aware of his own consequence. In ISO I, 

 when obliged by the state of his health to use the waters 

 of Bourbon rArchambaud, he wrote to Napoleon : ' I 

 regret being at a distance from you, for my devotion to 

 your great plans contributes to their accomplishment.' 

 After the battle of Ulm, Talleyrand addressed to the em- 

 peror a plan for diminishing the | lower of Austria to interfeic 

 with the preponderance of France, by uniting Tyrol to the 

 Helvetian republic, and erecting the Venetian territory 

 into an independent icpnblic interposed between the 

 kingdom of Italy and the Austrian territories. He pro- 

 posed to reconcile Austria to this arrangement by < 

 to it the whole of Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, and 

 the northern part of Bulgaria. The advantages he antici- 



! from this arrangement, were that of removing Austria 



from interfering in the sphere of French influence, without 



exasperating it, and that of raining in the East a power 



able than Turkey to hold a balance with Kuja. 



Napoleon paid no attention to the proposal. After the 



ry of Austerlitr, Talleyrand again pressed it upon his 

 notice, but equally without ctt'ect. No change in the feel- 

 ings of the emperor and his minister can positively be 



I to this event ; but we see on the one hand a pertiim- 



repctition of a favourite proposal, and on the other a 



silent and nit her contemptuous rejection of it. \Ve find at. 



a much later period Napoleon complaining of the pcrtina- 



I'h which Talleyrand was Mem-ton; at any 



advice which he considered important; anil we find Taf- 

 leyrfind sp.. a king of Napoleon as one who could not be 

 served because he would not listen to advice. And we 



t hut see in the diftV -pinion just men' 



lh commencement of that coolness which indip 

 rand, on the IHh of August, 1H07. to resign the portfolio of j 



foreign affair* and accept the nominal dignity of vice- 

 grand-elcctor of the titles of 



grand-fhamberlam and prince 01 H. Inch had 



;red upon him. An unpreccii 

 career ol victory had renilcnd Napoleon impatient of 



- ; the contciousnei* of important services had 



ation 



thus originated was increased and confirmed hy IIP- da*h- 

 ing hut vulgar soldiers, v.: .i:fluenlial 



part of the emperor's court, and their silly :r 

 wives, who M M. de Talleyrand his sup 



refinement, and who had all in tin 

 portable suca-m. Na]H)leon in exile is said to Ir 

 sented the resignation of M. de Talleyrand as in 

 and rendered necessary by lus stock-jobbing propeu- 

 It is not impossible that the minister may have - 

 more deeply in the funds than was altogether pi 

 had there been no oth- 



could, and often did, wink at more flagrant 

 delinquencies. M. de Talleyrand, in his charactci 

 chamberlain, did the honours of the impciia 

 Erfurt ; and was on more than one occasn 

 suited by the emperor, who one day said, 

 to ha. In iso;) how.- 



loud and unreserved in his comlcmr 

 expedition, that Napoleon, on his return from '. 

 sula, deprived him of the office of clumbcrlnin. The tost 



'ars of the empire elicited UK: 

 from M, de Talleyrand, which were duly earn 

 ears of the emperor, who retorted by sallies of abuse v- 

 irritated the prince wit hou ; him leas pov. 



In 1812 M. ue Talleyrand is said to 

 overthrow of the em put. In IKI:J overtur. - 



him with a view to his resuming the por" . 



affairs, but without success. In |Kl! he re-appeai. 



i- of active life on his own account. 

 In 1S14. as vice-graud-clcc tor of the empire, he was a 

 member of the regency, but was prc\enu-d JOUUI.L: 

 Blois by the national guard refusing to allow him to quit 

 Paris iiot. much against Ins will. When Paris ca 

 lateil, the emperor Alexander took uphis reside 



of the prince of Bcnevento. The words attri! 

 by the Memoirs of Kourrienne to Talleyrand, in ; 

 sations with those in whose hands the fortune ol war had 

 for the time placed the fortunes of France, are charact cr- 

 ime, and in keeping with his opinions and subse- 

 quent conduct: 'There is no other alternate 

 poleon or Louis XVIII. After Napoleon there is no one 

 who-c personal qualities would ensure him the sup] 

 ten men. A principle is needed to give consistency ' 

 new government, whatever it maybe: Ixniis \\lli 



is a principle. Anything but Napoleon or Louis 

 \\ 111. is an intrigue, and no intrigue can be strong enough 

 to support him upon whom it might confer power." Tins 

 view lends consistency to the conduct of M.de Talleyrand 

 at the close of Napoleon's career. Their alliance had 

 long been dissolved : they stood confronting each otl 

 separate and independent powers. M. de Talleyrand had 

 advocated a limited monarchy, until the old ifiion.- 

 violently broken up and overturned ; he had lent his aid 

 to construct a new monarchy and a new aristocracy out of 

 the fragments of old institutions which the Revolution had 

 .v France a train without a government, and, 

 with his principles, he might have consistently taken office 

 under any government, holding, as he did/the opinion 

 that any government is better than none, and thu: 

 man may hold office under it provided he take 

 as much good and as little ha; in a. he can. But M. '. 

 Talleyrand did more: he exerted thr influence IP 

 sesseo. over Alexander to obtain the combination <> 

 stitutiomil forms with the recognition of legitmi. 

 X \ 111. saved appearances by insisting upon being ai 1 



tit the (-barter spontaneously, but it was M. de Tal- 

 leyrand's use of the iciii ititiouary party 

 that made him feel the necessity of this i i, As 

 minister Talleyrand i ith a 

 precision I i an object of annny- 

 'i the courti eis ot 'the !' '. as ever the pedantic 

 Clarendon irrounded i 'luules II. 

 - t out tor li \ icnna. in September, 

 1*11, the court of F.I id to have piescntcd the 

 :i-pc. <>l nt the commencement of the holi- 

 The powers who had refused to concede to Napoleon at 



