188 



THE POPULAR EDUCATOR. 



KEY TO EXERCISES IN LESSONS IN GERMAN. 



EXERCISE 152 (Vol. III., page 139). 



1. He spends his time in doing nothing. 2. He spent the greatest 

 part of his youth at the gymnasiums and universities of his country. 

 3. He spends most of his time in useless occupations. 4. Many 

 people pass their time in eating, drinking, and sleeping. 5. With 

 every man who has hut a spark of feeling, his fatherland and its 

 welfare excels everything. 6. There is nothing like tranquillity of 

 soul, and the consciousness of having done one's duty. 7. He said 

 his greatest joy and his greatest treasure were his children, and with 

 him nothing surpassed them. 8. A sailor said there was nothing 

 like his pipe. 9. To an indifferent man many things are indeed the 

 same ; but he who says that everything is the same to him, is a liar. 

 10. What we have promised we should perform, whether disadvantage 

 or advantage arises from it. 11. In war all things must be alike to 

 a soldier. 12. A true man patiently adapts himself to all circum- 

 stances ; it is indifferent to him what he does, hut not how he does 

 it. 13. Since his children's death everything is alike to him ; he is 

 indifferent about those who surround him, and careless about the 

 course of his affairs. 14. Every man has his free will ; therefore it 

 does not concern me how he employs his time. 15. I travelled by 

 way of [uia] Rotterdam and London to America. 16. The friend just 

 now went across the street. 17. He pitied the poor boy, therefore 

 he received him into his house, and gave him a good education. 18. 

 He who has no pity for dumb animals, and who is unmerciful towards 

 them, has likewise no pity for mankind. 



LESSONS IN LOGIC. I. 



INTRODUCTION MENTAL OPER ATIONS TERMS- 

 PROPOSITIONS. 



MANY persons entertain a prejudice against the study of Logic, 

 believing it to be either so difficult that it is beyond the reach 

 of ordinary intellects, or else so useless as not to be worth any 

 labour it would cost. From the tone and abstruse style of many 

 even of the professedly elementary books upon the subject, this, 

 perhaps, is hardly to be wondered at ; but our aim in these 

 lessons will be, by presenting a few of the broad outlines of 

 Logic before our readers in as plain and simple terms as pos- 

 sible, and by pointing out the practical benefits to be derived, 

 especially in self-education, from some acquaintance with its 

 principles, to show the real groundlessness of such opinions ; 

 and by so doing to induce some of our readers to pursue the 

 study for themselves, and so acquire an amount of intellectual 

 training the possession of which they will always find valuable. 



What, then, we must inquire at the outset, is Logic ? a 

 question which, it must be admitted, is much easier to ask 

 than to answer accurately and concisely. From the time of 

 Aristotle, the earliest systematic writer upon Logic, hardly any 

 two persons have been quite agreed upon its definition or the 

 mode in which it should be treated. Even to enumerate these 

 definitions and views would be impossible, and we must be 

 satisfied with trying to get a general idea, which may be popu- 

 larly intelligible, of the subject and aim of Logic, as it is regarded 

 in modern times. 



Until comparatively lately Logic was treated of by most 

 writers as the Art of Thinking, a conception too vague and wide 

 to be capable of realisation. The late Archbishop Whately, 

 who contributed at least as much as any other writer to restore 

 Logic to the place which it should occupy in education, regarded 

 it as the science and the art (not of thought or thinking in 

 general, but of one only out of the many branches of thinking) 

 of Reasoning. So far as it institutes an analysis of the process 

 of the mind in reasoning he views it as a science, and so far as 

 vfc furnishes practical rules, derived from those principles, for 

 guarding against erroneous deductions, he views it as an art. 

 One of the ablest thinkers of modern times, John Stuart Mill, 

 defined it as " the science of all the operations of the under- 

 standing which are subservient to the estimation of evidence, 

 or, more shortly, the science of evidence or proof." This view, 

 it will be seen, embraces a much wider field than Archbishop 

 Whately's. Without, however, critically examining these or 

 any of the other numerous definitions of Logic, it will be suffi- 

 cient for our present purpose if we understand that it aims at 

 investigating the principles which every thinker observes (con- 

 sciously or unconsciously) in reasoning, when he reasons soundly, 

 and at deducing from them rules to guard against error or care- 

 lessness in the process of reasoning. So far as the former aim 

 is concerned, we may regard it as a science ; while, in reference 

 to the latter aim, it may be considered as an art. A science 



treats of theoretical or speculative knowledge only, while art is 

 the application of knowledge to practice ; the study of a science 

 may be nothing more than pleasant, the pursuit of an art must 

 possess some practical utility. 



It is generally laid down that the operations of the mind are 

 three Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning. This is 

 a statement the meaning of which we must clearly understand. 

 It may, perhaps, seem strange to be told for the first time that 

 it is possible to find any system or principle of classification 

 amongst the different thoughts and ideas which are always 

 passing, apparently at random, through our minds. It may 

 seem that each idea and operation of the mind is so unlike 

 every other that it must be impossible to group them into 

 classes possessing any features of resemblance. Reflection 

 and analysis, however, have proved the contrary ; and the 

 three divisions above given ultimately include them all. Simple 

 apprehension is the operation by which the mind receives ideas. 

 This it does through various channels through sight, hearing, 

 and touch, for example. But whatever may be the means 

 through which the idea (using this word in its popular accepta- 

 tion) is conveyed to the mind, the faculty or operation which 

 the mind exercises in merely receiving it is called Simple Appre- 

 hension. When the mind has thus got ideas it does not rest 

 there : it compares them one with another, and determines 

 whether they agree or disagree. For instance, having thus 

 received or apprehended the ideas of fire and heat, it compares 

 them, and pronounces that they agree ; or the ideas of iron and 

 softness, it compares these, and pronounces that they disagree. 

 The result in each case is expressed in a Judgment in the one, 

 " fire is hot," and in the other, "iron is not soft." Judgment, 

 then, is the comparing together in the mind two of the ideas 

 got by apprehension, and pronouncing that they agree or that 

 they disagree with one another. A third process yet remains. 

 A person after he has pronounced the judgment of agreement, 

 " that is a fire," may join this (in a manner subsequently to be 

 explained) with a previous judgment, "fire is hot," and conclude 

 from the two combined " that is hot." When this is done, the 

 mind has gone through a process of reasoning. So, too, in the 

 other example given above, the Reasoning faculty will have been 

 exercised if, from joining the two judgments, " iron is not soft," 

 and " that is soft," we conclude " that is not iron." Reasoning, 

 then, may be defined to be the act of the mind in proceeding 

 from certain judgments to a third founded upon them. 



Language, even if not (as some think) the only means by 

 which all these several operations of Apprehension, Judgment, 

 and Reasoning can be carried on within the mind, is, at least, 

 the means we are obliged to use in communicating them to 

 others. We shall therefore consider the different ways in which 

 the notions gained by these operations are expressed in language. 



Briefly, an act of Apprehension is denoted by a term ; an act 

 of Judgment, by a proposition ; and an act of Reasoning, by an 

 argument (called, as we shall subsequently see, when expressed 

 in the particular manner required by the rules of Logic, a 

 syllogism). Each of these must be examined separately. 



A Term (or name, as it is called by some) may consist of one 

 word or of several, according to the sound or sounds used in each 

 particular language to express the idea or object for which it 

 stands. In our own language (as, indeed, in most others) the 

 vast majority of terms consist of single words ; and it is neces- 

 sary to gain some insight into their import and classification 

 before we can proceed farther with our study of Logic. This 

 will be obvious, if we consider that the knowledge thus gained 

 will enable us to understand the meaning and analysis of Propo- 

 sitions (which are expressed in words), and to guard against 

 many errors and defects which otherwise might creep into our 

 Reasoning (which we must also carry on through the instrumen- 

 tality of words). 



J. S. Mill defines a term as " a word (or set of words) serving 

 the double purpose of a mark to recall to ourselves the likeness 

 of a former thought, and a sign to make it known to others :" 

 and it hardly seems requisite to expand this definition. A term 

 is, however, explained, perhaps, more popularly by Archbishop 

 Whately as " the view we take of an object." Terms have been 

 divided into a number of classes, of which the following are the 

 principal : 



(1.) Into singular (or individual) and common (or general). 

 A singular term is one which is only capable of being truly 

 affirmed, in the same sense of one thing e.g., " Julius Ccesar," 



