

45. LETTER EXOLOBIXO CHEQUK. 



Du! u^.,1882. 



A. Iv: 



Sir, Your favour of i ily to bond, cover- 



intf invoioo of goods forwarded in case P T, No. 5, for which I 

 bog to hand you choquo for J6450, of which please acknowledge 

 receipt by return of post. 



By Bonding your now patterns for the coming Mown as early 

 as pouiblo, you will oblige, Sir, yours truly, 



I'M [LIP TKEHDALE. 



lin, le 12 Avril 1882. 

 Monsieur A. Lonmlule, a Londras. 



Monsieur, J'ai bion recu votre honoroe da 10 Arril, couvrant 

 facture ii des marohandisas exp&lities dans la cause P T, No. 5, 

 ]><>iir losquellea jo vous remets mon cheque do 4450, dont 

 veuillez m'accusor reception par rotour du courri.-r. 



Vous m'obligeriez boauooup en m'envoyant lo plus tot possible 

 vos nouveaux cchantillons pour la liaison proohaine. 

 Keoovoz, Monsieur, mos salutations sinceres, 



- PHILIP TEEBDALK. 



46. LETTKE WITH ACCOUNT CURRENT. 



Paris, January, 1882. 

 Messrs. Walkor & Marshall, Leeds. 



Gentlemen, As we are closing our books for the past year, 

 we be? to hand you an extract of your account current, showing 

 a balance in your favour of .2,822 5s. 6d. to the 31st December, 

 1881, which we carry forward. 



Believe us, Gentlemen, yours truly, 



A. LELEUX & Co. 



Paris, Janvier 1882. 

 Messieurs Walker & Marshall, a Leeds. 



Messieurs, Oocupes du regloment de nos livrea pour 1'anneo 

 qui vient de s'ccouler, nous avons 1'avantage de vous remettre 

 le releve de votre oompte courant, presentant un solde en votre 

 faveur de .2,822 5s. 6d. au 31 Decembre 1881, que nous repor- 

 tons i nouveau. 



Recevez, Messieurs, nos salutations cordiales, 



_ A. LELEUX & C". 



47. REPLY TO PRECEDING LETTER. 



Leeds, February, 1882. 

 Messrs. Leloux & Co., Paris. 



Gentlemen, Your favour of .... ult. is duly to hand, covering 

 extract of our account current with you, which wo find correct. 

 Wo have carried forward the balance in our favour of 

 2,822 5s. 6d. to the 31st December, 1881, in conformity. 

 We are, Gentlemen, yours faithfully, 



WALKER & MARSHALL. 



Leeds, Fe"vrier 1882. 

 Messieurs Lelenx & C ie , a Paris. 



Messieurs, Votre honoree du ... nous est bien parvenue, 

 couvrant le releve de notro compte courant chez vous, que nous 

 avons trouvo correct. 



Le solde en notre faveur de 2,822 5s. 6d. a etc porte" a compte 

 nouveau, valour au 31 Decembre 1881. 



Nous vous saluons, Messieurs, aveo empressement, 



WALKER & MARSHALL. 



LESSONS IN LOGIC. II. 



THE consideration of Species and Genera naturally leads to 

 that of Division and Definition, as they are regarded by 

 logicians. 



The name Individual is sometimes given to a Singular term, 

 because it cannot be divided logically ; or, in other words, is 

 incapable of being analysed into several subordinate species, or 

 into individuals. We are metaphorically said to divide a term 

 when we enumerate its several significations ; for the reason 

 that wo then distinguish many things in one. Thus, if we say 

 that "animal" is both "man" and "brute" (i.e., that the 

 term animal has those two significations), we are said to >liri<le 

 "animal" into "man" and "brute." Division, then, which 

 is thus applicable only to a common or universal term, may be 

 defined as " the distinct enumeration of the several things which 

 aro signified by a common or universal term." 



The process which is the opposite t Division is called lime* 



tm 



of 



I 



.. 



rwUsoKen. ThU proeess U carried on by means a 

 which is, speaking generally, the separate eoi 

 certain attributes uf an object, the rest being 1*1 

 Let us take, as an illustration, oar idea of any is 

 lea includes, amongst others, the several 

 stance, body, life, anastion. and rsssoa. together 

 of a particular height, figure, countenance, colour, birth, etc. 

 all which Utter Ideas are p*c*Uar to the individual man. while 

 the former are eomnum to him and all other men. No* 

 take into consideration the former attribute* only, and dir* 

 gard the latter. w have, instead of the idea of a particular 

 man, that of "man" in general. In other words, w. have by 

 the exercise of abstraction eflMroUsei, w.. arrived at an idea 

 more general or universal than that with which we started. The 

 idea of " man" thus obtained may be gemrslUsd still further. 



If we leave out of the ideas contained m it that of i 

 is peculiar to man, we shall have the idea of **hst*ane. body. 

 life, and sensation remaining, which are common to man with 

 other living beings. We thus arrive at the still more gsamal 

 idea of "animal;" and in thu instance we might carry the pro- 

 cess of generalisation even still further. Enough, howevei. hoc 

 been said to make clear what is meant by calling Division and 

 Generalisation the opposite* to one another t for, as fat the 

 former we add on the differences by which several things are 

 distinguished so as to enumerate each of them by a differs** 

 and distinct name, so in the Utter we lay aside the diffsiaaos* 

 to call all the things by one common name. 



Logicians are accustomed to enumerate several laws to be 

 observed in Division, some of which, indeed, hardly deserve the 

 name. The principal of them, however, are thess three. 

 (1) Each of the parts, or any number of them short of all, must 

 contain less than the thing to be divided, i*., must have a 

 narrower signification. (2) All the parts, taken together, most 

 contain neither more nor less than the thing to be divided t 

 they must be exactly equal to it in extent. (3) The parte or 

 members of the Division must be opposed, .., any portion of 

 one of them must not be contained in any other. Books must 

 not bo divided, for instance, into "English," "Quarto," and 

 " Poetical ; " for if this were done, some of the individuals of 

 each class would be contained in both of the other two. To 

 guard against violating this Uw, the sama principle of division 

 adopted at its commencement must be kept in view through- 

 out the process. 



The use. of the word Definition in Logic is also metaphorical ; 

 for, originally meaning "marking out by boundaries, 

 hero employed to signify the expressions and words by which 

 those things which wo wish to distinguish from one another 

 are discriminated from those which border on them, like folds 

 by their boundaries. 



There are two kinds of definition, Nominal (nomen. a nasw), 

 which explains the meaning of the term defined ; and Real, which 

 explains the nature of the thing which the term signifies. 

 A Real Definition, again, may be either Accidental or Aaratiai, 

 i.e., it may either assign to the thing to be defined what may 

 be called its accidental attributes (e.g., its causes, effects, pro* 



perties, or other things of that kind), or give what a 

 as the constituent parts of its essence, these being the attribute* 

 which the object must possess in order to belong to the par- 

 ticular species. An Essential Definition may also be divided 

 into Logical, which consists of the Genus and Difference ; and 

 Physical, which enumerates the parte of the thing which are 

 art'milly separable. "Man," for instance to illustrate these 

 several methods of Real Definition may be defined Accidentally 

 as "a featherless biped; " Logically, as "a rational animal " 

 (" animal " being the Genus, " rational " the Difference) ; and, 

 Physically, as "a natural existence consisting of an organised 

 body and a rational soul.' ' 



Definition has its rales also, as well as Division, of which the 

 three principal, which are very obvious, are . (I) A good 

 Definition must be ade.ptate, i.e., it must not be either narrower 

 or wider than the thing to be defined : if it were too narrow it 

 would include less, and if too wide more, than the whole signifi- 

 cation of the thing. If we defined "man" as "a living cob. 

 stance," we should commit the former mistake: if as "a 

 rational animal of a white colour," the Utter. (2) The Definition 

 must be in itself clearer than the thing to be defined, otherwise 

 it would not explain it. (3) It must be couched in a conreaient 

 number of appropriate words, %.., words in common us*. If CM 



