303 



THE POPULAR EDUCATOR. 



155. Numquid vis ? An ordinary formula of leave-taldng among 

 the Romans, meaning literally, " Do you wish anything of me ? " 

 "Can I do anything for you? 1 ' Cures tuain fldem, preserve your 

 character, i.e., don't undeceive for the present the people who believe 

 you are acting basely. Fidem may be used in a bad as well as a good 

 sense. Fit Bedulo, lit., it is being dona with care ; translate, I'll take 

 care. 



156. Sed quid ais? An expression used in colloquial Latin when 

 the speaker wishes to call special attention to some fresh subject he is 

 about to introduce ; lit., but what have i/ou to say on this point; translate, 

 But look here. Ubi habet, where does Tie dwell ? Habet used for 

 hubitat. 



157. Recepit, either Tie got back, or Tie retained 1 . Posticulum, a small 

 bacJc building. 



160. Juxta cum mea, exactly the same as my oixn (daughter). 



161. Rcgaturu's, abbreviated for rogaturus es. 



163. Argutum. The word is applied to a man, " qui semper arguit," 

 " who is alwuys wrangling," and may be translated spiteful, babbling. 



165. Assidui, gossiping, who take svery chance of sitting down to- 

 gether, and pulling their neighbours to pieces. Scurras. This word 

 had not at this period acquired che objectionable force which it had 

 afterwards. At this time it was the usual term applied to the wits 

 and fine gentlemen of the day. 



166. Egomet traho, I quite include myself among them, I am just as 

 bad as any of them, because I have lent an ear to their lies. 



169. Habiturust, for habiturus est. 



173. Falsone, fTiey do not care the least (lit., a lock of wool) toTiefher 

 their indiscriminate praise or blame of any one be false or true. Quern 

 velint is the object of the two verbs laudent, culpent. 



174. Dum illud sciant, provided only they 7cnou> u-hat the;; please to know. 

 177. Evortisset, old form for evertisset. 



179. Prosilui castigatum, I started forth to accuse. Supine in um 

 after a verb of motion. 



182. Famigeratori res sit, the talebearer itere to be held responsible and 

 suffer damage and loss. A very similar idea is to be found iu Sheridan's 

 " School for Scandal," where Sir Peter Teazle expresses his wish that 

 there was a law passed to punish the originators of all scandalous 

 stories : 



".Mrs. Candour. But surely you would not be quite so severe on 

 those who only report what they hear ? 



" Sir Peter. Yes, madam ; I would have law merchant for them too ; 

 and in all cases of slander currency, whenever the drawer of the lie 

 was not to be found, the injured parties should have a right to come 

 on any of the iudorsers." 



184. Faxim, for facerim, I'll be bound. Qui sciant, I'll be bound u-e 

 should have very few knowing (i.e., saying the-j know) what they don't. 



As a specimen of the powers of Plautus in a more serious 

 vein, we subjoin from the same play the thanksgiving of Char- 

 mides to Neptune for his prosperous voyage : 



TEINUMMUS, ACT IV., Sc. 1, 1. 1 3. 



CANTICUM. CHAKMIDES. 



Salsipotenti et multipotenti lovis fratri cctherei, Neptuno, 

 Laetus lubens laudes ago, et gratis gratas habeo, et fluc- 



tibus salsis, 

 Quos penes mei fuit potestas, bonis meis quid foret et 



meas vitas, 

 Quom suis me ex locis in patriam urbis tutalam redu- 



cem faciunt. 

 Atque ego tibi, Neptune, ante alios deos gratis ago atque 5 



habeo summas. 

 Nam te omnes ssevom, severum atque avidis moribus com- 



memorant, 

 Spurcificum, immanem, intolerandum, vesanurn. Ego contra 



opera expertus. 

 Nam pol placidum to et clementem eo usque modo, ut volui, 



usus sum in alto. 



NOTES. 



1. .Etherei. The epithet is applied to Jupiter as King of Air, in 

 opposition to Salsipolens, JCin j of the Deep. 



2. Gratis gratas grateful thanks (grates) , 



3. Quos penes, etc. Who Iwve had it completely in their power to 

 determine tchat should be the fate of my goods and myself. Penes fuit 



ei potestas is a somewhat tautological expression; lit., in, whose 

 ..ands was the dominion over me. 



4. Patriam urbis tutelam, my country and the protection of the 

 eity. 



5. Ago atque habeo, I feel and express. 



6. Ssevom. Old spelling for ssevum. 



7. Opera. By actual fact, by experience. 



8. Pol. A short form of the more common Edepol, by Pollitr, a 

 frequent, oath. Eo usque modo ut volui, earacfli; in the way in loTuc 

 I wished. 



LESSONS IN LOGIC. III. 



SYLLOGISMS: THEIE STRUCTURE, ETC. 



HAVING now defined a Syllogism, and mentioned some of the 

 most common erroneous views about syllogistic reasoning, we 

 aave next to examine somewhat more closely into its structure, 

 and into the different rules which have been framed to ensure 

 the correctness of all reasoning which is reducible to this 

 Form. 



At the root of the syllogistic theory lies the fact that every 

 Conclusion is, in reality, deduced or derived from two other Pro- 

 positions, called Premises, i.e., propositions premised. Many per- 

 sons have been led to deny this, because both the premises are not 

 always expressed, one of them, indeed, being commonly omitted ; 

 but in every case it will be found that the admission of the second 

 or suppressed premise is essential to the validity of the con- 

 clusion as an inference. This will appear evident from sup- 

 posing the truth of the suppressed premise to be denied, when 

 it will found that we have no sufficient grounds to warrant our 

 inferring the truth of the conclusion. If, for example, any one- 

 asserts that from the single premise, " the world exhibits marks 

 of design," he can draw the conclusion that " the world must 

 have had an intelligent author," his error will be seen if an. 

 opponent denies that "whatever exhibits marks of design must 

 have had an intelligent author." This will at once make it 

 evident that it is not from one premise alone that the conclusion 

 is inferred, but from two in combination, whether they are both 

 expressed or not. Any other example of syllogism which 

 might be taken would equally illustrate this. "Where, as above, 

 one of the premises is suppressed, the argument is called by 

 logicians an Enthymeme, though this is not the correct use of 

 the term. 



When a syllogism is stated in correct logical form, the 

 premises are placed first, and the conclusion last ; the latter 

 being, in all cases, that which is to be proved, and the former 

 that by means of which this is proved. 



There are several kinds of syllogisms, differing in the kinds 

 of propositions of which they are composed; but we are at 

 present speaking only of the Categorical Syllogism, all three 

 propositions of which are puro categoricals. 



Let us take a syllogism of this sort, and examine and analyse 

 it, e.g. . 



All men are mortals ; 

 Socrates is a man ; 

 Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 



Now, upon reflection, it will appear evident, in the first place, 

 that the validity of the argument in such a case does not at all 

 depend upon the truth of the premises. Either or both of 

 these might be false or absurd, and yet the argument be quite 

 sound, i.e., the conclusion follow from them, so that if they 

 were true, it would be true also, and so that it would be impos- 

 sible for any one to deny the truth of the conclusion, and yet 

 admit that both of the premises were true. "All men are 

 stones ; this bird is a man ; therefore, it is a stone," is a 

 syllogism exactly corresponding to the one above given, and its 

 reasoning is perfectly correct. The conclusion follows neces- 

 sarily from the premises, and when once they are admitted, the 

 conclusion must be admitted also, as necessarily following- 

 therefrom, and this although both the premises are really false. 

 Hence, of course, it is not even necessary, in order that we 

 should be able to determine upon the validity of a syllogism, 

 that we should understand fully the meaning of the terms of 

 which its propositions are made up ; so that we can just as 

 well represent such a syllogism as the above by means of 

 symbols without any fixed meaning. "All Y is X; Z is Y; there- 

 fore, Z is X," will be a correct and valid argument, no matter 

 what X, Y, and Z may be employed to represent. 



The rule for testing the validity of syllogisms, laid down by 

 Aristotle (and called the Dictum, de omni et nullo), is this : 

 " Whatever is predicated (i.e., affirmed or denied) universally 

 of a term (in other words, of a term distributed), whether affir- 

 matively or negatively, may be predicated in like manner (i.e. t 

 affirmed or denied), of everything contained under it." Thus, 

 in the examples we have taken, "mortal" (X)is affirmed univer- 

 sally of the term " men " (Y), i.e., of this term distributed, 

 and " Socrates " (Z) is contained under " men " (Y) ; therefore 

 "mortal" (X) maybe affirmed of "Socrates" (Z). This rule 

 may be applied immediately or ultimately (as we shall after- 



