12 



THE POPULAR EDUCATOR. 



SECOND FUTURE. 



I shall ' Sing. 3d; n>erbe gefcblag.cn Ijabcn, I 



shall have struck. 

 <Du nrirft gefdjlagen fyaben. 

 Sr mirb gefdjlagcn baben. 

 Plur. 2Bir tuerben gefdjlagen Ijaben. 

 3b.t luerbct gefdjlagcn baben. 

 @ie njcrben gefcblagen fi.aben. 



SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD. 

 PRESENT. IMPERFECT. 



FIRST FUTURE. 



Sing. 3d; toerbe fdjlagen, 

 strike. 



!Du n;irft fd;Iagen. 



@r nnrb fdjtagen. 

 Plur. 2Bir vuerben fdjlagew. 



3tjr tocrbet fd;(ngn. 



@ie toerben fd;lagen. 



Sing. 3d; fdjlage, I may strike. 



<Du fd;Iageft. 



6r fdjlage. 

 Plur. 2Btr fd;Iagen. 



3I;r fcfjtaget. 



@ie fd;tagcn. 



PERFECT. 



Sing. 3d; Ijnbe gefdfjtagen, I may 

 have struck. 



35u Babeft gefdjtagen. 



(r ^abe gefd;(agen. 

 Plur. 2Bit baben gefcf)tagen. 



3^r babet gefcljtagen. 



@ie |aben gefdjtagen. 



FIRST FUTURE. 



Sing. 3d; toerbe fd;kgen, 

 shall strike. 



$>u Joerfccfl fd;lagcn. 



@r icerbe fd;tagen. 

 Plur. 2Bir toerbcn fcbtagen. 



3&,r nxtbet fdjlagen. 



<Sie iutrten fdjfogen. 



(if) I 



1. 3d; fd;tuge, I might strike. 

 5)u fdjtugefl. 

 (5r fd)tiige. 

 Plur. 2Btt fdjtugen. 

 3^r fdjtugct. 

 @te fdjtugen. 



PLUPERFECT. 



Sing. 3d; ^vitte gefdjtagen, I might 

 have struck. 



2>u tjatteft gefcljtagcn. 



r I;attc gcfdjtagen. 

 Plur. SBir Ijfitten gcfcfjtagen. 



3b,r battet gcfcfjtagen. 



@ie fatten gcfd;tagcn. 



SECOND FUTURE. 



Sing. 3d; n>crbe gefdjtagen baben, 

 (if) I shall have struck. 



S)u n>erbefl gefd;tagen tjaben. 



6r toerbe gefdjlagcn baben. 

 Plur. 2Bir n>erbcn gefdjlagen Ijaben. 



3l;r )crbet gcfd;lagcn I;aben. 



<te toerben gcfdjlagen ^aben. 



CONDITIONAL MOOD. 



FIRST FUTURE. 



Sing. 3d; ftuvbe fdjlagen, I should 

 strike. 



3)u hwrteft fdjtagen. 



ST wurte fd;(agcn. 

 Plur. SGBir wurttn fd;(agn. 



36.r luucbet fd)lagen. 



@ie ftiirben fdjlagen. 



SECOND FUTURE. 



Sing. 3d; hnirbc gcfd;lagcn I;abcn, I 

 should have struck. 



!Du toiivbeft gefrf;(agen I;abcn. 



@c rourbc gefcfjlagen fyabcn. 

 Plur. 3Btr tourbcn gcfd;tagcn fyabcn. 



3(;r rourbct gefd>lagcn 6,abcn. 



@ie tourtcn gcfdjtagen Ijabcn. 



IMPEEATIVE MOOD. 

 PRESENT. 



Sing. @d;(nge (bu), strike thou. 



d;tage er, let him strike. 

 Plur. @d)lagcn n>ir, let us strike. 



cfytagct (if)r), strike ye. 



f lc < I 6 * them strike. 



ctylagen, to strike. 



INFINITIVE MOOD. 

 PERFECT. 



efdjtngcn tyaben, to 

 have struck. 



FIRST FUTURE. 

 <Sd;!agcn tocrben, to be 

 about to strike. 



PARTICIPLE. 



PRESEKT. 



<gd;lagcnb, striking. 



PERFECT. 



(agcn, struck. 



KEY TO EXERCISES IN LESSONS IN GERMAN. 



EXERCISE 170 (Vol. III., page 278). 



1. Both friends were tired of disputing longer with each other. 2. 

 The king and the empress, wearied with the long quarrel, at last made 

 peace. 3. As the wind hlew tolerably hard and without cessation, we 

 already saw land after fourteen days. 4. A very cold wind is Mowing 

 to-day, and I am afraid that we shall have snow. 5. The wind has 

 much ahated since dinner-time ; it does not blow so hard by far as it did 

 this morning. 6. There was such a cold and cutting air blowing, that 

 it chilled both his hands within five minutes. 7. Is my father still 

 alive ? 8. Yes, he is still living, hut our young friend is no more. 9. 

 It is well for him ; he is gone where there is no more snow. 10. He, 

 the sustainer of so many poor people, is no more. 11. On what does 

 this poor family live ? 12. What is talked of ? 13. Of whom do they 

 speak ? 14. That is something which you do not understand. 15. 

 What is the conversation about ? 16. Of whom have you heard this ? 

 17. From whom have you received this fine present ? 18. The poacher 

 shot at the gamekeeper, but the ball missed its aim ; and before he 

 could fire another shot, he himself fell, hit by the gamekeeper's shot. 



19. The fortress was surrendered without a shot, and without a sword 

 being drawn. 20. He shot several times in the garden to frighten 

 away the birds. 21. The young Englishman passed by our door just 

 now. 22. Ho passed by me without perceiving me. 23. This man has 

 l^t. the most favourable time of his life pass unemployed. 21. When 

 Frederick the Great was greatly honouring and publicly praising a 

 young officer after a battle, he answered, " Your Majesty embarrasses 

 me by this honour." 25. Take this letter to the post, John, and get 

 this gold watch repaired. 26. Have you already been to the minister, 

 and have you attended punctually to my orders ? 27. Yes, my lord, 

 I have attended to them. 28. I have not taken a step out of the 

 house to-day. 29. Although I have taken the first step towards a 

 reconciliation, yet it is hard for him to take the second. 30. In his 

 sixteenth year he paid his first visit to foreign countries. 31. This 

 young scholar tries to keep pace with the elder one. 



LESSONS IN LOGIC. Y. 



FALLACIES. 



A FALLACY is defined by Archbishop Whately as "any un- 

 sound mode of arguing, which appears to demand our con- 

 viction, and to bo decisive of the question in hand, when in 

 fairness it is not." The part of Logic which deals with the 

 classification and detection of the different kinds of fallacies is 

 naturally the most popular and interesting, as well because 

 it seems less dry and barren than the consideration of abstract 

 rules, as because it exhibits in a more palpable form the 

 practical use of an art of Logic in teaching men to guard against 

 some of the mistakes in reasoning into which they might other- 

 wise fall. 



Now it will upon reflection appear plain that an argument 

 may be incorrect or unsound in either of two ways viz., either 

 in the manner in which the conclusion is made to result from 

 the premises, or in the grounds upon which one or both of the 

 premises are themselves laid down or assumed. We may either 

 reason wrongly from right premises, or our premises may be false 

 while our reasoning from them is correct. In either case our sup- 

 posed argument will be fallacious, the fallacy lying, according 

 to the language of logicians, in the former case in the form, and 

 in the latter, in the matter, or, more technically still, in dictione, 

 i.e., in the words, in the one case, or extra dictionem, i.e., out- 

 side the words, in the other. 



In accordance with what has been previously said of the 

 province of Logic, it does not profess to teach us to guard 

 against errors and mistakes in the matter of our reasoning. 

 This can only be done by a perfect knowledge of the particular 

 science or branch of knowledge to which the premises of our 

 argument relate ; but when the premises are laid down, then 

 the observance of the rules of Logic, as a test, will ensure that 

 no error shall creep in between them and the conclusion. 



The great division of fallacies, then, is into those in the form 

 and those in the matter; into those in which the conclusion 

 does not follow from the premises, and those in which it does. It 

 is not, however, always possible accurately to determine to which 

 of these two classes a fallacious argument should be referred. 

 Thus in enthymemes it is often a matter of choice, whether the 

 premiss left to be supplied should be taken to be one which is 

 not true, or one which does not prove the conclusion. To take 

 an example given by Archbishop Whately : if a man argues 

 from the fact that a particular country is distressed, that it is 

 under a tyranny, his suppressed premiss may be either " every 

 distressed country is under a tyranny " (which is plainly false), 

 or " every country under a tyranny is distressed " (which does 

 not prove the conclusion, as the middle term will be undistri- 

 buted in both premises). Now, if the former premiss be the one 

 meant to be supplied, the fallacy is to be referred to those in 

 form ; if the latter, to those in the matter. This illustration 

 shows how hard it is to attempt any classification of fallacies, 

 to which some may not except. The outline of the classification 

 which we shall adopt will be that of Archbishop Whately, and 

 many of our examples will be taken from the same writer, whose 

 chapter on Fallacies is probably the most valuable and interest- 

 ing of his whole work. 



We have seen that in every argument which professes to 

 assume the syllogistic form, the conclusion either does or does 

 not follow from the premises ; and that, in the latter case, 

 where the conclusion does not follow from the premises, the 

 fault lies not in our imperfect knowledge of the subject-matter, 

 but in the reasoning alone. Hence, as these fallacies are viola- 



