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THE POPULAR EDUCATOR. 



pleasure to be derived from its very contemplation so great, 

 that it would be impossible for any one really to know what it 

 was, and yet not practise it. 



It is quite true that there has been from time to time a varia- 

 tion in the standard of what is pleasant and beautiful in actions, 

 just as there has been in the standard of beauty and excellence 

 in painting, sculpture, and the other fine arts; but still the 

 standard has always been the'same in kind, even where it has 

 differed greatly in degree. No one has ever tried to set up the 

 standard of virtue as that of vice, or vice versa. Our very nature 

 pronounces against such an attempt. And this fact suffices, 

 when properly developed and reflected on, to answer those who 

 argue against the immutability of moral distinctions, and who 

 try to prove that there is no real difference between right and 

 wrong, on the ground of the difference in the manner in which 

 actions have been judged in different times and countries. For 

 the real fact is that the standard will be found, on examination, 

 never to have varied substantially, although the nearness to 

 the perfection which it requires has been farther from attain- 

 ment at certain periods than at others. 



The perception of the action as right or wrong, and a conse- 

 quent feeling of pleasure or pain, does not, however, complete the 

 analysis : there is also, in the third place, what has been termed 

 our perception of the merit or demerit of the action. " The 

 virtuous actions performed by other men," says Dugald Stewart, 

 "not only excite in our minds a benevolent affection towards them, 

 or a disposition to promote their happiness, but impress us with 

 a sense of the merit of the agents. We perceive them to be the 

 proper objects of love and esteem, and that it is morally right 

 that they should receive their reward. . . . On the other hand, 

 when we are witnesses of an act of selfishness, of cruelty, or 

 oppression, whether we ourselves are the sufferers or not, we 

 are not only inspired with aversion and hatred towards the 

 delinquent, but find it difficult to restrain our indignation from 

 breaking loose against him." And again, " In our own case, 

 when we are conscious of doing well, we feel that we are en- 

 titled to the esteem and attachment of our fellow-creatures. . . . 

 The feelings of remorse which accompany the consciousness of 

 guilt involve, in like manner, a sense of ill desert, and an 

 anticipation of future punishment." 



Thus, whenever we see an action and reflect upon it, we have 

 these three feelings, in some order or other : (1) a perception of 

 the act as right or wrong, (2) a perception of it as agreeable or 

 the reverse, and (3) a perception of merit or demerit in the 

 agent who performs it. Different schools of modern philosophers 

 give different accounts of the order in which these arise in the 

 mind, and endeavour to resolve one or two of the three into the 

 remaining one. 



Having now in some measure touched upon the different 

 questions with which the Science of Ethics attempts to deal, 

 or, at any rate, having pointed out the nature of the subjects 

 upon which it treats, we shall proceed to consider, somewhat in 

 detail, the two great schools into which moralists have been 

 divided, almost from the very earliest times, according to the 

 views which they have taken upon these various topics, and 

 others of a kindred nature. 



One of these systems of Ethics has been termed inductive, 

 utilitarian, or selfish; and the other intuitive, independent, or 

 sentimental. We shall consider them separately, taking the 

 former first. 



The great distinctive feature of utilitarianism, as its najne 

 implies, is that it recognises utility or interest as the great 

 motive to action, and only regards an action or course of con- 

 duct as virtuous or vicious according as it does or does not tend 

 to procure happiness or pleasure, or to secure the interest of the 

 agent directly or indirectly. 



This theory, as was naturally to have been expected, has 

 been held in different forms and in different degrees ; the lowest 

 form of all, perhaps, being Epicureanism, in which, as already 

 explained, the one natural and praiseworthy motive to action 

 was the gratification of the animal or sensual appetites or 

 instincts of the individual. Every act of virtue, according to 

 Epicurus, is done ia order to promote and secure the happiness 

 of the agent. Friendship, for instance, is to be pursued by the 

 wise man only for its usefulness ; and his explanation of justice, 

 the greatest of all the virtues in the estimation of the ancients, 

 was similar. " To abstain from what is another's," to quote 

 from Adam Smith's account of the system, " was not desirable 



on its own account, and it could not, surely, be better for you 

 that I should possess what is my own than that you should 

 possess it. You ought, however, to abstain from whatever 

 belongs to me, because by doing otherwise you will provoke the 

 resentment and indignation of mankind. The security and 

 tranquillity of your mind will be entirely destroyed. . . . That 

 other species of justice, which consists in doing proper good 

 offices to different persons, according to the various relations of 

 neighbours, kinsmen, friends, benefactors, superiors, or equals, 

 which they may stand in to us, is recommended by the same 

 reasons. To act properly in all these different relations pro- 

 cures us the esteem and love of those we live with ; as to do 

 otherwise excites their contempt and hatred. By the one we 

 naturally secure, by the other we necessarily endanger, our own 

 ease and tranquillity the great and ultimate objects of all our 

 desires." 



In modern times a theory of morals, more or less identical 

 with this, has been put forward, and supported with all the 

 genius of such men as Paley, Bentham, and J. S. Mill. Paley 

 defined virtue as " the doing good to mankind, in obedience to 

 the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." 

 According to this definition, no act which is not performed for 

 the sake of the happiness of the agent in a future life, at any 

 rate, can be called virtuous. This doctrine is refuted by the 

 necessary consequence resulting from it that every act, insti- 

 gated solely by the promptings of generosity or benevolence., 

 must be a vice. Nor upon this theory is obedience to the will 

 of God anything but a vice, when, even though done from 

 motives of love and gratitude to Him, it is done from any other 

 motive except a desire to secure the reward which He has 

 promised to obedience to His will. These and similar considera- 

 tions are sufficient to show upon reflection the error of this 

 theory of virtue ; in addition to which, it is quite clear that in 

 numberless cases acts of virtue are performed, without any con- 

 sideration whatsoever of future punishment or reward being 

 present to the mind of the agent. There is, of course, at the 

 root of such a theory the fact discovered by experience that in 

 the long run virtue and happiness coincide, and that, however 

 it may seem to bo the contrary in individual cases, yet a man 

 will ultimately be rewarded in some way for acting rig-htly. 

 " The usefulness of actions is the mark set on them by the 

 Supreme Legislator, by which reasonable beings discover it to 

 be His will that such actions should be done." 



An equally able advocate of the principle of utility was 

 Jeremy Bentham ; which he maintained should be the chief 

 motive to human conduct. From the point of view of Bentham 

 and his followers, the motive which is always to influence us in 

 our actions is a regard to the consequences which will ensue 

 either to mankind at large, or, according to the lowest form of 

 this theory, to ourselves individually. That an act will promote 

 " the greatest happiness of the greatest number," or oar owa 

 self-interest, is not only a reason and a sufficient one for per- 

 forming it, but also for denominating it a virtuous act ; and, in 

 fact, if from any other consideration we had refrained from it, 

 we should have acted viciously 



Butler sums up well against this resolution of virtue into 

 benevolence in his Essay on Virtue. " Without inquiring how 

 far, and in what sense, virtue is resolvable into benevolence, 

 and vice into the want of it, it may bo proper to observe, that 

 benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no 

 sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case . . 

 . . our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent 

 to everything but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, 

 and the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should 

 neither approve of benevolence to some persons rather than to 

 others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any other 

 account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness was fore- 

 seen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by the 

 second." That this, however, is not the case, but that other 

 considerations are taken into account, he proves by several 

 instances. If, for example, two men are competitors for any- 

 thing of equal advantage to each, a third person will be ao 

 counted as exhibiting the virtue of gratitude, if he do3S his best 

 to obtain it for one of the two, from whom he may have received 

 some kindness. Or, if one man was by fraud or violence to 

 take from another his rightful property, and give it to a third, 

 who would, in his estimation, receive as much pleasure from its 

 possession as would more than balance the loss of pleasure to 



