LKSSONS IX MoliAL 



the first ownjr from being deprived of it, then such an action, 

 though every one would unhesitatingly pronounce it vicious, 

 i, on Bontham's theory, be virtuous. "The fact," says 

 r, "appears to be that we are constituted so as to condemn 

 falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of 

 benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all 

 :. -ration which conduct is likeliest to produce an over- 

 balance of happiness or uiiery." 



.1 dim Stuart Mill has been the ablest advocate of the utilitarian 

 theory of recent times, and it will be well to consider some- 

 what in detail tho account of it, and the arguments in support 

 of it which he has put forward, chiefly in his " Essay on 

 Utilitarianism." Ho states the theory thus : " The creed 

 which accepts, as tho foundation of morals, utility, or the 

 greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in 

 proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they 

 produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is in- 

 tended pleasure, and tho absence of pain ; by unhappiness pain, 

 and tho privation of pleasure." And he gives as the theory of 

 Hfe, on which this theory of morality is founded, this " that plea- 

 sure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends ; 

 and that all desirable tilings are desirable either for the pleasure 

 inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure 

 and prevention of pain." And in accordance with this he defines 

 the standard of morality as " the rules and precepts for human 

 conduct, by the observance of which an existence, exempt as far 

 as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, 

 both in point of quantity and quality, might be to the greatest 

 extent possible secured to all mankind ; and not to them only, 

 but, so for as the nature of things admit, to the whole sentient 

 creation." 



Further on in his Essay, Mill says, " There is in reality 

 nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired, other- 

 wise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately 

 to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not 

 desired for itself until it has become so " (a statement which to 

 some may appear somewhat contradictory). " Those who desire 

 virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the conscious- 

 ness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being 

 without it is a pain, or for both reasons united." The evidence 

 which is to be offered in support of this theory, is "self -conscious- 

 ness and self -observation, assisted by observation of others." 



Dr. McCosh, in his " Examination of J, S. Mill's Philosophy," 

 has stated several objections against the theory of utilitarianism 

 as advanced by Mill. (1.) It does not account for the peculiar 

 idea and conviction which we have in regard to moral good and 

 evil. (2.) It does not embrace sufficient sanctions (i.e., means 

 of enforcing its commands) to induce us to approve virtue and 

 condemn vice. (3.) It does not furnish a sufficient test of 

 virtuous acts and of virtuous motives, and (4.) it does not 

 embrace all the virtues. We have not space, however, to 

 examine these separately and in detail. 



Before, however, dismissing the theory of utility altogether, 

 it will be well to mention the arguments for and against the 

 adoption of utility as the moral standard, as they are given by 

 Professor Bain, in hia able work on " Mental and Moral 

 Science." 



The first point urged in favour of utility is that the greater 

 part of tho morality has, and always has had, reference to the 

 welfare of society, i.e., the carrying into effect the aims of 

 morality would be productive of happiness to society at large. 

 This is even the case in the morality of the Bible, where the 

 last six of the ten commandments are, as he says, utilitarian, 

 i.e., aim at preventing misery and securing happiness amongst 

 mankind. 



But, more than this, the welfare of society is considered as a 

 justification for laying down many rules, and enforcing or at 

 least expecting obedience to their requirements ; and their very 

 utility is often urged as the chief, if not the only motive for 

 yielding obedience to them. 



When a new law is to be made, or an old one done away with, 

 utility is frequently the only standard of action appealed to ; 

 in which case its supporters are often termed mere advocates of 

 expediency, which may be a most proper motive of action. 



And, lastly, Bain observes that there is an increasing ten- 

 dency every day to withdraw from the moral code, or at nil 

 events to withdraw from the sphere of legal restraint, all actiocs 

 which have no connection directly or indirectly with the welfare 



of society, e.g. tha observance of the Sabbath, 01 01 a form of 

 " established " religion. 



Tho principal objection against the utilitarian theory hat 

 been already mantioned that utility is not the sole motive tt 

 human action, and that men frequently act deliberately and in 

 preference from motives quite different, and with a view to 

 quite different ends. Nay, more than this, men often act, when 

 influenced by passion* of one kind or another, in way* which do 

 not tend in any way to the happiness or benefit of themselves 

 or any one else. A regard to virtue itself also baa often been a 

 sufficient motive to induce men to forfeit almost the whole 

 happiness of their lives, and even their very live* themselves, 

 when they could not perform the act of virtue without the sacri- 

 fice. To say, as the utilitarians say, that virtue in thin case u 

 regarded not as the end, but as the means to the attainment 

 of some state of happiness either for others or for the agent 

 himself in another life, seems at variance with the testimony 

 given by experience. 



Another strong objection against the theory of utility is this : 

 that the effects and bearings of particular acts on human 

 happiness are very frequently too remote and numerous to be 

 calculated, and that, evon when it is possible to estimate then 

 all with anything like accuracy, a man is often called upon to 

 act so promptly that he has not time to make the necessary 

 calculation. To this it is hardly a satisfactory reply to be told 

 that the individual has not himself in each case to make such a 

 calculation ; that it has already been made for him by the ex- 

 perience of men who have gone before him, and who have em- 

 bodied the results of their experience in the form of moral rules 

 and maxims which will guide him in the general run of case.* 

 that may arise. For besides the fact that many fresh cases 

 must arise, to suit which rules do not exist, it is, to say the 

 least of it, a very unusual nso of terms, to call that the motive 

 of a man's act which is not present to his mind and consciously 

 influencing him at the moment he performs it. If the individual 

 does not act in the particular manner because he knows that an 

 overbalance of happiness will be tho result, the fact that sucb 

 a result will ensue cannot truly be said to influence him at all. 



In the manner in which utilitarianism is generally stated it 

 may also be objected, that it does not furnish any incentive to a 

 man to promote the happiness of others ; that the utility which 

 is pointed out to him especially to regard is his own self-interest, 

 and that the theory is at bottom nothing but one of selfishness 

 or self-love. " Utility is a sufficient motive to pursue our own 

 happiness, and the happiness of others as a means to our own ; 

 but it does not afford any purely disinterested impulses ; it is a 

 selfish theory after all." Bearing in mind the fact that Bishop 

 Butler has shown that self-love is a right and proper motive to 

 action when kept within proper limits as any other, this is tho 

 objection which the utilitarian finds it, perhaps, easiest to 

 answer ; and, indeed, there are some writers of the utilitarian 

 school whose systems are hardly open to this charge ; but our 

 object being to give the leading principles of each school, and 

 the chief objections which have been brought against them, it 

 would be out of place to discuss them in detail. 



As might be imagined from their theory of the nature of 

 virtue and vice, the utilitarian or inductive school hold that 

 ; morality is not intuitive, but is the result of experience. In 

 j other words, they assert that there is no faculty in our minds 

 which could inform \is d priori what was right and what was 

 wrong, before the effect of particular actions had been learnt 

 by experience. Men found, according to this view, that one 

 course of conduct produced happiness to themselves or others, 

 and that the contrary course similarly produced unhappiness : 

 end consequently they handed down from one generation to 

 another the result of their experience, and all who came after, 

 knowing that particular acts would produce happiness, and 

 other particular acts unhappiness, called the former virtuous 

 and the latter vicious. But prior to this inductive process 

 there was nothing in men's nature which would l3ad them to 

 adopt the one course of conduct rather than tha other : there 

 was no faculty of their mind which would approve of the one 

 and disapprove of the other, irrespective of consequences and 

 I before any knowledge of them. 



We may, then, fitly consider next this question concerning the 

 nature of the moral faculty, and the different arguments which 

 have been brought forward on each side of the controversy. 

 Those who assert that the moral faculty is intuitive, and pro- 



