8 CORRELATION OF PHYSICAL FORCES. 



abstract causation. If we regard causation as invariable 

 sequence, we can find no case in which a given antecedent is 

 the only antecedent to a given sequent : thus, if water could 

 flow from no other cause than the withdrawal of a floodgate, 

 we might say abstractedly that this was the cause of water 

 flowing. If, again, adopting the view which looks to causa- 

 tion as a force, we could say that water could be caused to 

 flow only by gravitation, we might say abstractedly that gra- 

 vitation was the cause of water flowing but this we cannot 

 say ; and if we seek and examine any other example, we shall 

 find that causation is only predicable of it in the particular 

 case, and cannot be supported as an abstract proposition ; yet 

 this is constantly attempted. Nevertheless, in each particular 

 case where we speak of Cause, we habitually refer to some 

 antecedent power or force : we never see motion or any 

 change in matter take effect without regarding it as produced 

 by some previous change ; and, when we cannot trace it to its 

 antecedent, we mentally refer it to one ; but whether this habit 

 be philosophically correct may be disputed. In other words, 

 it seems questionable, not only whether cause and effect are 

 convertible terms with antecedence and sequence, but whether 

 in fact cause does precede effect, whether force does precede 

 the change in matter of which it is said to be the cause. 



The actual priority of cause to effect has been doubted, 

 and their simultaneity argued with much ability. As an 

 instance of this argument it may be said, the attraction which 

 causes iron to approach the magnet is simultaneous with and 

 ever accompanies the movement of the iron ; the movement 

 is evidence of the co-existing cause or force, but there is no 

 evidence of any interval in time between the one and the 

 other. On this view time would cease to be a necessary ele- 

 ment in causation ; the idea of cause, except perhaps as re- 

 ferred to a primeval creation, would cease to exist ; and the 

 same arguments which apply to the simultaneity of cause with 

 effect would apply to the simultaneity of Force with Motion. 

 We could not, however, even if we adopted this view, dispense 

 with the element of time in the sequence of phenomena ; the 

 effect being thus regarded as ever accompanied simultane- 

 ously by its appropriate cause, we should still refer to some 



