220 CONTINUITY. 



butes a type of the class. This process gives us an abstract 

 idea, and we then transfer this idea to the Creator, and make 

 him start with that which our own imperfect generalisation 

 has derived. It seems to me that the doctrine of types is, in 

 fact, a concession to the theory of continuity or indefinite 

 variability ; for the admission that large groups have common 

 characters shows, necessarily, a blending of forms within the 

 scope of the group, which supports the view of each member 

 being derived from some other member of it : if this be so can 

 it be fairly asserted that even the assigned limits of such 

 groups have a definite line of demarcation ? 



[The constant use of different terms has frequently led to 

 a settled conviction that the things signified are as broadly 

 distinct as the terms used. Take, for instance, the terms 

 ' instinct ' and ' reason ; ' for centuries these have been re- 

 garded as distinct mental attributes, and it is only in recent 

 years that the merging of the one into the other has been 

 discussed even as a possibility. 



Is what is called instinct other than a process of reasoning 

 carried on in a limited sphere, and very perfect within that 

 sphere, because from long habit and hereditary transmission 

 it has become stereotyped in the race ? 



The bee has learned gradually by using mere mechanical 

 means to save space by forcing the cylindrical cells of its honey- 

 comb against each other, until by pressing out the intervening 

 matter they become hexagons, and not by a mathematical in- 

 stinct, as it used to be called. By similar transmitted habits he 

 knows the honey-bearing flowers by their colour or their scent. 

 The mind of the higher animals the dog, for instance is more 

 diffuse, but attains less perfection in any limited sphere ; his 

 wants and habits being more various, his brain has more 

 varied power ; but when he buries a bone or points at a par- 

 tridge I see no reason for supposing that he feels compelled by 

 some power extraneous to himself to do these acts, but pro- 

 bably feels as much acting from the impulse of his own mind 

 as an Esquimaux making a 'cache' or lying in wait for a seal. 

 Thoughts which may seem intuitive in the individual are pro- 

 bably the result of experience accumulated and transmitted 

 in the race, and gradually modifying the structure of the brain 



