150 DARWINIAN A. 



grandparents, in a slight degree, or in whatever de- 

 gree, would the case be altered in this regard ? 



The whole argument in natural theology proceeds 

 upon the ground that the inference for a final cause of 

 the structure of the hand and of the valves in the veins 

 is just as valid now, in individuals produced through 

 natural generation, as it would have been in the case of 

 the first man, supernaturally created. Why not, then, 

 just as good even on the supposition of the descent of 

 men from chimpanzees and gorillas, since those ani- 

 mals possess these same contrivances ? Or, to take a 

 more supposable case : If the argument from structure 

 to design is convincing when drawn from a particular 

 animal, say a Newfoundland dog, and is not weakened 

 by the knowledge that this dog came from similar par- 

 ents, would it be at all weakened if, in tracing his 

 genealogy, it were ascertained that he was a remote 

 descendant of the mastiff or some other breed, or that 

 both these and other breeds came (as is suspected) from 

 some wolf? If not, how is the argument for design in 

 the structure of our particular dog affected by the sup- 

 position that his wolfish progenitor came from a post- 

 tertiary wolf, perhaps less unlike an existing one than 

 the dog in question is to some other of the numerous 

 existing races of dogs, and that this post-tertiary came 

 from an equally or more different tertiary wolf ? And 

 if the argument from structure to design is not invali- 

 dated by our present knowledge that our individual 

 dog was developed from a single organic cell, how is 

 it invalidated by the supposition of an analogous 

 natural descent, through a long line of connected forms, 



