1 4 DARWINIANISM. 



its effect. The cause is the cause, the effect is the 

 effect ; the effect is not the cause, and the cause is not 

 the effect. The cause is A ; but the effect is B. And 

 A is not B. What binds B to A why does B always 

 follow A ? We do not see what " binds : " " we only 

 find," says Hume, " that the one does actually, in fact, 

 follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is 

 attended with motion in the second. This is the whole 

 that appears." No doubt, as I say, Huine,/o?' his own 

 purpose, took full advantage of the dilemma. And it 

 was very absurd that Keid, Oswald, and Beattie kept 

 asseverating that there was a connection, that there was 

 a necessity. Hume never disputed that ; he only asked 

 for the reason : and not one of them ever attempted to 

 produce it. Of course, Hume's illustration is very 

 unfortunate for himself ; for the reason of the connection, 

 the reason of the necessity was very apparent as regards 

 the billiard balls. The problem did not lie either in the 

 ball A or in the ball B ; but it did lie in the single 

 thing, the motion between them. Perhaps Hume did 

 not think of that ; but he did think, as " instinct" he 

 confessed, taught him, that there was a "natural" 

 necessity, that is, ;i natural reason in the whole business. 

 And I do think he would have been astonished that 

 Stewart, Brown, and the rest made as though they took 

 him at more than his word, and that there was no power,' 

 efficacy, efficiency nothing but invariableness in the 

 relation of causality as such. Nay, I do believe he 

 would even have been astonished at Keid in thinking him- 

 self obliged to admit that his (Hume's) reasonings applied 

 to " inanimate," but not to " intelligent causes." Hume, 

 I doubt not, knew perfectly well that in inanimate 

 causes there were no exceptions. A man chooses for his 

 purposes an agent, an agent that is adapted to them, a 

 knife to cut his meat, a hammer to drive his nail, a 



