6 Darwinism and Other Essays. 



metaphysics may imagine such a "pull," and 

 may interpret it as the " action " of something 

 that is not Deity, but such a conclusion can find 

 no support in the scientific theorem, which is 

 simply a generalized description of phenomena. 

 The general considerations upon which the belief 

 in the existence and direct action of Deity are 

 otherwise founded are in no wise disturbed by 

 the establishment of any such scientific theorem. 

 The theological question is left just where it was 

 before. We are still at perfect liberty to main- 

 tain that it is the direct action of Deity which is 

 manifested in the planetary movements ; having 

 done nothing more with our Newtonian hypoth- 

 esis than to construct a happy formula for ex- 

 pressing the mode or order of the manifestation. 

 We may have learned something new concerning 

 the manner of Divine action ; we certainly have 

 not " substituted " any other kind of action for it. 

 And what is thus obvious in this simple astro- 

 nomical example is equally true in principle in 

 every case whatever in which one set of phenom- 

 ena is interpreted by comparison with another 

 set. In no case whatever can science use the 

 words " force " or " cause " except as metaphori- 

 cally descriptive of some observed or observable 

 sequence of phenomena. And consequently at 



