68 A CRUMB FOR THE [v. 



Spencer with any opinion he does not hold, and I 

 speak subject to correction ; but, if my memory 

 serves me, I have more than once heard him in 

 conversation urging this very objection to any ma- 

 terialistic interpretation of evolution. His wonder- 

 fully subtle chapter on " The Substance of Mind " l 

 contains, as I understand it, the same argument ; but 

 it is easy to rniss an author's meaning sometimes 

 when the point expounded is so formidably abstract 

 and general. 



Be this as it may, we are not helped much by 

 supposing the germs of mind to have been somehow 

 latent in the primeval nebula. The notion is too 

 vague to be of any use. The only point on which 

 we can be clear is, that no mere collocation of 

 material atoms could ever have evolved the phe- 

 nomena of consciousness. Beyond this we cannot 

 go. We are confronted with an insoluble meta- 

 physical problem. Of the origin of mind we can 

 give no scientific account, but only an historical one. 

 We can say when (i.e., in connection with what 

 material circumstances) mind came upon the scene 



1 Principles of Psychology, second edition, ii. 145-162. [On referring 

 this point to Mr. Spencer, he desires me to add that I am quite correct 

 in my recollection of his conversations and in my interpretation of his 

 position.] 



