vi.] CHAUNCEY WRIGHT. 89 



Our faith in the constancy of Nature results, there- 

 fore, from our inability to overcome or " go behind " 

 the certified testimony of experience. Such is the 

 primary psychological fact, about which there is no 

 reason to suppose that Mr. Wright and Mr. Spencer 

 would disagree. But this, like many other facts, has 

 two sides ; or at least, there are two possible ways 

 of interpreting it, and here arises the misunderstand- 

 ing. On the one hand, our belief in the constancy 

 of Nature may be the result of an immense induction 

 or counting up of the whole series of events which 

 show that Nature is not capricious ; or on the other 

 hand it may be the generalisation of a simple assump- 

 tion which we make in every act of experience, and 

 without which we could not carry on any thinking 

 whatever. The first alternative is the one defended 

 by Mr. Wright in common with Mr. Mill, while the 

 second is the one more prominently insisted upon by 

 Mr. Spencer. To me it seems that Mr. Spencer's 

 view is very much the more profound and satisfac- 

 tory ; but I fail to see that there is necessarily any 

 such practical antagonism between the two as is 

 implied in recent controversies on the subject. On 

 the other hand, it seems clear to me that the two 

 views are simply two complementary or obverse 

 aspects of the same fundamental truth. 



