ix.] MR. BUCKLE'S FALLACIES. 161 



Reviewing our conclusions in this compact form, we 

 see that moral truths come under the same category 

 as intellectual truths, throughout. This confirms what 

 we said at the outset, that there is no such difference 

 between them as Mr. Buckle supposes, and that both 

 should be spoken of together as truths or judgments 

 in distinction from feelings. Mr. Buckle's argument, 

 then, when laid bare, is as follows : that some truths 

 are constant, while others are not which is false ; 

 and that one set of truths receives additions, while 

 another does not which is also false. 



But this is not all. Our author's argument is not 

 only untenable, but it is irrelevant to the subject in 

 debate. Even if he could establish his point, he 

 would be none the more forward. Startling as this 

 assertion may seem, it is nevertheless indisputable. 

 For if his reasoning hitherto were valid, it would 

 prove merely this that our knowledge of some sub- 

 jects advances, while our knowledge of others does 

 not. But Mr. Buckle's professed object is to show 

 that feeling, as compared with knowledge, is of no 

 account as a civilising force. To what end, then, 

 does he go so far out of his way in giving us this 

 jumble of ill-digested argument to show the "supe- 

 riority" of some intellectual acquisitions over others? 

 This singular aberration results from his confounding 



M 



