Chap, i.] Danger and Abjurdlty of Metaphyfics. 417 

 been thought proper to refort fo little to proof and 

 obfervation, or to attribute fo much to conjecture and 

 theory. 



Metaphyfical fubtleties, and hypothefes carried to 

 a vifionary extreme, have, therefore, greatly contri- 

 buted to confufe this branch of knowledge ; though 

 when extricated from thefe, I apprehend full as much 

 is known in this fcience as in any other, and perhaps 

 more than in moft. On this account I fhall carefully 

 avoid all thofe difputed points concerning identity and 

 diverfity, exiftence, infinity, &c. that haye divided the 

 learned from time to time. I confider them, in truth, 

 as utterly foreign to my purpofe, and as tending to 

 eftablifh no one uieful principle. It will be unneceflary 

 alfo to examine the origin of our ideas, or to enter into 

 nice difquifitions concerning fpace, duration, &c. &c. 

 as fuch inquiries are certainly more curious than ufeful. 

 I (hall further avoid all fanciful theories refpecting the 

 nature of our perceptions. Some of them, 1 confefs, 

 are plaufible, but J rather chufe to lay the ground 

 work of my reafoning on actual experience j let thofe 

 who fo incline, extend at their leiiure their refearches 

 further. 



That fcheme, which reduces the moral powers of mart 

 to the fewelt principles, if thefe can be demonftrated ade- 

 quate to_every effect, is moft fatisfictory to the rational 

 inquirer. The more of nature we difcover, the more 

 fimple (he appears in her operations : it is unphilofo- 

 phical unneceffarily to multiply caufes. It is evident, 

 for inftance, that there exifts in men a relifh for beauty, 

 as well as for moral excellence, and an antipathy to 

 vice and deformity. But how are thefe affections ge- 

 nerated ? It is an indolent method of philofophizing to 

 ftop at whatever is noc eafily underftood. Final caufes 



VOL, III. E e ancl 



