Chap. 2.] Whether Perception is the fame in all Men. 423 

 rain circumftances, and to the unknown caufes we 

 affign thefe names. 



The information of the fenfes is the laft refort of 

 human reafon ; I mean their joint information, for it 

 appears they correct each other. It has been already 

 itated, that the judgments we form of material chi.ngs are 

 notfo much the effect of an impreffion on anyone fenfe 

 as of thole of feeing and feeling combined*. Simple 

 impreffions or perceptions are not to be defined, nor 

 do they, from that agreement and analogy which 

 exifts between the fenfes of all mankind, require 

 definition. 



It is of no confequence whether the fenfes of different 

 men perceive exactly alike, though it is probable there 

 is not much difference in this refpect. It is of no 

 confequence, whether one man fees objects larger than 

 another, or whether the fame compofition affords to 

 each precifely the fame tafte or fmell. We commu- 

 nicate our ideas of fenfations by the help of relation; 

 we call a thing fmall when compared with another j we 

 call the tafte of a certain viand fweet, or a found grave 

 or deep, and we have nothing further to do to be 

 clearly underftood, than to mark the proportionate 

 Differences and relations, 



It is to be remarked, that all objects that prefent 

 themfelves to our fenfes do not make fuch impreffions 

 as to leave ideas behind them, Many times the mind 

 is too much engaged with one train of thoughts to 

 admit another. An impreffion or fenfation being 



on which to aft. The difputes therefore of philofophers, whether 

 fmeils are in the nofe or in the perfon who fmells them, &c. &c. 

 are merely de lana caprina\ and there muft be a union of caufes to 

 produce fuch effeft. Such dlfputes may ferve to exercife the hu- 

 fnan faculties, but they undoubtedly make no addition to our 

 4lpck of real knowledge, 

 f $ee JJopk 9. c. 37. 



Ee 4 per- 



