Chap. 4.] Commn Satft: . 433 



health." Here it is plain that common experience fa 

 frequently unices the confequence to the caufe, that 

 9mitting all the intermediate fteps neceflary to form 

 the eonclufioB, the mind is fatisfied with the afTertion, 

 and calls it felf-evident. This is what ibme authors 

 (if I am not miftaken) mean by common Jenfe j and in- 

 deed thcfe conclufions are fo generally right, that al- 

 though it may be for the interefts of virtue, occafionally 

 to examine them by the principles of reafoning, men 

 in moft cafes have very little occafion for any other 

 appeal than to their common feelings, to determine on 

 the ju ft ice or injuftice of particular actions j ideas of 

 juftice being founded in the truth of things, and fo con- 

 firmed by experience, that the conclufions are as ready 

 at hand, and almoft as clear as that " the fun (bines ;" 

 " what is, is ;" or any other of thofe maxims that are 

 really felf-evident. 



On this principle of aflbciation depends the neceflary 

 fucceffion of ideas in a train, -of which any one may 

 fatisfy himfelf by attending to the operations of his 

 own mind. Ideas are introduced by an agreement in 

 fome of the parts of which complex ideas are compofed. 

 Shakefpear, defcribing a merchant's fears, fays, 



'** l^Iy wind, cooling my broth, 

 " Would blow me to an ague, when I thought 

 " What harm a wind too great might do at fea. 

 *' I fhould not fee the fandy hour*glafs run, 

 " But I (hould think of {hallows and of flats; 

 *' And fee my wealthy Arg'fie dock'd in fand. 



" Should I go to church, 

 *' And fee the holy edifice of ftone, 

 " And not bethink me ftrait of dangerous rocks * ?" 



. 



It is remarked, that the train of ideas almoft always 

 depends upon the relations of contiguity in. time or 



* Merchant of Venice, fc, i. 



VOL. Ill, F i place, 



