434 Train of Ideas. [Book X. 



place, caufe and effect, refemblance or contrariety j all 

 of which it is obvious, depend on the principles of 

 aflfociation already explained. It has been fully proved, 

 that ideas are affoeiated by contiguity of time j the 

 former impreflion remaining vivid fome moments 

 after it was firft made, and the other during that time 

 occurring, they become united. That aflbciadon 

 which arifes from unity of place is no other than recol- 

 lection, the place making a part of the complex idea 

 of any action. Caufe and efrect are affoeiated by con- 

 tiguity of time ; for, as Mr. Locke oblerves, " we get 

 thefe ideas from our obfervation of the viciffitude of 

 things, while we perceive fome qualities or fubftances 

 begin to exift, and that they receive their exiftence 

 from the due application and operation of other 

 beings *." The relation of refemblance is no other 

 than recollection of that particular idea, in which the 

 object prefent, and the object remembered, agree. 

 When two ideas are formed, agreeing in any quality or 

 qualities, they are faid to be related ; and the degrees 

 of relation are as they agree in fewer or more qualities. 

 Refembiance in one fimple and very common quality, 

 as black, round, &c. will feldom recal an idea, unlefs 

 very recently or very ftrongly imprinted, the mind be- 

 ing confufed with the multitude of objects pqflefling 

 that quality. 



The aiTcciation of ideas with -their contraries feems 

 to arife, rft, When the idea fo remembered is only 

 a negative idea, and derives its exiftence from its po- 

 fitive; thus cold is the want or decreafe pf heatj 

 ficknefs is rhe want of health j poverty of riches ; &c. 

 ad, When die ideas are connected in point of time *, 



* Locke, B. ii. c. 26. 



f " Eye-witnefles generally relate in the order of time, without 

 any exprefs dcfign of doing to." Hartley on Man, 



