444 Invention *nd Judgment. [Bock X. 



diftincl: powers of the mind, and not the fame power 

 differently employed; but the only two great diftinc- 

 tions that I perceive in the human mind are, memory 

 and genius, which, it is certain, do not always meet 

 in the fame perfon. Perhaps the reafon they are feldom* 

 found to exift together *, in any confiderable extent, 

 may be a certain inertnefs in minds of the forme read, 

 which enables them to retain ideas in the grofs, but 

 vrhich difables them from feparating, analizing, or 

 making new combinations. A very vivid mind is not 

 only ftruck with an object as a whole, bwt every con- 

 ftituent part is obferved, and makes, if I may fo ex- 

 prefs it, a feparate impreflion ; thefe parts are, there- 

 fore,- liable to become feparately aflbciated with parts 

 of other complex images, and the fame vividnefs and 

 activity of mind will produce naturally thefe frequent 

 afibciations. 



* I woul<! not be underftood to reprefent memory, and even 

 very flrong powers of memory, as inconfiflent with genius ; on the 

 contrary I am well aflured, that a good memory is one of its efFen- 

 tial condiments. I-wouldbe underftood to {peak of thofe uncom- 

 mon memories which retain not only the ideas, but the language 

 of authors, and which will recoiled with little trouble not only the 

 the words of voluminous productions.. 



