Chap. 7.] [ 445 



CHAP. VII. 



OF JUDGMENT. 



Judgment ; what, - Jljftnt* Probability. 



WHEN the mind examines and compares ob- 

 jects or ideas, recalling in a feries, and turn- 

 ing them over, fb as to diftinguifh their natures, qua- 

 lities, or relations, it is faid to judge. To the act it- 

 felf, or the power of performing it, we give the name 

 judgment, and often the conclufion or inference is called 

 a judgment. 



Ideas are objects of the judgment ; firft, in diftin- 

 guifhing one idea from another : this act of the mind 

 has given rife to the technical terms ufed by logicians, 

 identity and dherfity. Mr. Locke calls this the firft 

 act of the mind, which, he obferves, " it does with- 

 out any pains or deduction, by its natural power of 

 perception and diftinction." idly, Ideas are objects 

 of the judgment, in perceiving the relation which one 

 bears to another, or the particulars in which they agree 

 one with another. Thus, by the firft, we obferve; 

 that blue is not purple ; and yet, by the fecond, we 

 perceive, that purple approaches nearer the colour 

 blue than yellow does. Or, to give a plainer inftance 

 We perceive by the firft act of judgment, that two 

 is a different number from four ; and, by the fecond, 

 that they have this property in common, that they are 

 both even numbers. 



Mr. Locke obferves, that truth and falfehood be- 

 long properly to propofitions *. Truth is, firft, % 



B. a. c. f 2, 



conformity 



