Chap. 8.] Jbftfafi an& General Terms. 44$ 



ninety-nine, and another of an hundred^ but by .^the 

 Words. 



When we obferve any quality, or fet of qualities, 

 that are connected with feveral different objects, we 

 conftitute thence an abftracl word, iuclj are round- 

 nejs, ivbifenefsj human nature^ &c. 



General terms are formed, by obferving that there 

 are fome qualities in which certain things agree, though 

 differing in others ; we rank, therefore, all the objects 

 fo agreeing under a general head, or c'als them. Thefe 

 general terms do not excite any idea unlefs a particular 

 one. Thus, if by the word man any idea is excited, 

 it muft be that of a particular man. The word animal 

 is dill more general, yet if any diftinct idea accompanies 

 it, it is only that of a particular animal. In this cafe, 

 however, there is no danger of confufion, if the ge- 

 neral term is well underllood, that is, if the particular 

 qualities to which it is meant to refer are defined, and 

 diftinctly pointed out, then any man or any animal will 

 fcrve completely to reprefent the whole clafs in thole 

 agreeing qualities, which the general term ferves to 

 expreis *. It is manifeft this is a refinement of human 

 invention, to prevent the inconvenience of qonftantly 

 referring to proper names, which would be almoft as 

 laborious as the contrivance of Swift's philofophers, to 

 converfe without words, by bringing the thing fpokea 

 of within fight of the parties. 



The general terms reprefenting mixed modes, fuch as 

 parricide, virtue, &c. have only to be defined in the 

 fame manner, by pointing out the actions or qualities 



* In the whole bufinefs of genera and fpecies, the genus, or 

 more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the 

 fpecies, and the fpecies of what is to be found in each individual. 

 See Locke, b. iii. c. 6. 



VOL. III. G g they 



