Chap. 1 6.] Theory of a Moral Swje, 495 



There are fome points, it is added, in .which all men 

 agree; bccaufc there are feme -deductions, which alt 

 men endued with fenfes nearly alike* cannot fail to 

 draw. There are forne ideas which will be aflbciated 

 in every mind that reflects. Of this nature are the 

 common opinions of virtue and vice. Every being 

 fcrnfible of pleafure and pain muft alfo be fenfible of 

 love and hatred. Very little experience will convince 

 any man that particular actions are attended with ill 

 effects, and others in like manner with good ones, 

 No matter whether to ourfelves or others, we have 

 the idea good and bad annexed to the actions, before 

 we have the idea of the perfons to whom they relate; 

 we have them from our own experience, or fomething 

 adequate : we love the one and hate the other, we love 

 whatever promotes the one, and the contrary. 



We very early come to have a fenfe of injuftice, 

 fince whatever difappoints the appetites, or is pro- 

 ductive of prefent pain, generates refentment in an 

 infant. Thefe ideas are regulated by reafoning and 

 education, and men in time learn to diftinguifh be- 

 tween a misfortune merited, * or which they have 

 brought upon themfelves, and one which is brought 

 upon them by others ; they learn too to diftinguifh be- 

 tween chance and defign, and hence our hatred to 

 injuftice, &c. 



The quick fenfe of honour and fhame, it is further 

 alledged, can be no argument in favour of inftinctive 

 morality, for we are much more afhamed of natural 

 defects 1 ; there are few men that would not rather be 

 called knaves than fools. 



The reafon men are afhamed of fenfual enjoy- 

 ments, is the loathing and difguft that follow excefs in 

 them; there is no excefs, no difguft, no fatiety in the 

 6 pleafure^ 



