Chap. 20.] frm pbyfical Caufe and EfeSt. $ 1 1 



is the dictate of nature and common fenfe ; one of the 

 firft perceptions we have of the operations of our own 

 minds. It does not lie with us, therefore, to prove, 

 that the human mind is free ; but it lies with the op- 

 ponents of liberty to prwe, that it is not free ; and 

 this ought to be done upon direct, pofitive, experi- 

 mental evidence, and not upon fanciful analogies of 

 conjecture. 



The only argument which the fatalifts have ever 

 been able to adduce, which at all bears upon the point, 

 is this that men act from motives, and thefe motives 

 are dependent upon fituation and external circum- 

 ftances. This, then, is really the point at iflue be- 

 tween the fatalifts, and the advocates for the free 

 agency of man. The former fuppofe the influence of 

 motives from external caufes to be abfolute and unli- 

 mited; the latter allow the influence of the motives to 

 a certain extent, but they deny that it is abfolute and 

 unlimited. 



In the prefent ftate of human knowledge, it is, in- 

 deed, a fpecies of dogmatifm not to be endured, to 

 pretend precifely to afcertain how far the influence of 

 external motives extends over the mind of man. That 

 external caufes mould have a certain weight and influ- 

 ence with us, is certainly confident with the wifdom of 

 Divine Providence, and confident with that order and 

 regularity which he has every where eftablifhed. If men 

 were to act entirely independent of all influence from 

 external caufes and circumltances, the world would be an 

 entire fcene of confufion and diforder; if, on the con- 

 trary, they were endued with no power of choice or 

 deliberation, the whole would be an inanimate uniform 

 mafs, fubject to certain and definite laws, as much as 



it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there 

 we are at liberty." Locke's Eflay, B. ii. c. 24. 



inert 



