5 i 1 Point at I/ue wifh tit Fstalijls. [Book X. 



inert matter. In this, therefore, the fame happy me- 

 dium appears to be eftdbliflied as in other inftances. 

 Man, from his natural relation to external things j from 

 that wonderful connection which exifts between the 

 body and the mind, is fubject to a certain influence from 

 fituation and circumftances j but there is dill in his 

 own mind a power of reflecting, deliberating, and de- 

 ciding upon his motives and conduct. 



Another argument in favour of fatality is deduced 

 from the prefcience of the Deity. " If God foreknov/s 

 all things (it is alleged) then every event muft be 

 predetermined." But this argutrent refts upon the 

 fame prefumptuous foundation as the preceding, which 

 would pofitively determine the precife degree of in- 

 fuence that external caufes muft have upon the mind 

 of man. Dogmatifm certainly never was the road to 

 truth, and is utterly inconfiftent with that modefty and 

 humility, whicli is the very characteristic of a real phi- 

 lofopher. The prefcience of the Deity ! Who will 

 dare to fay that he is able to define it ? Who will dare 

 to ailege rhat he underilands every particular circum- 

 ftance and attribute of the Divine exiftence ? To fay 

 that God cannot exercife his own powers in that way 

 which is moil agreeable to the ends that infinite wif- 

 dom propofes, and infinite goodnefs would dictate, is, 

 to define and limit omnipotence ! and to affirm that 

 God cannot conftitute man a free agent, c&nnct in this 

 inftance difpenfe with his own prefcience, is to fay, that 

 God is not omnipotent. This was long my own opinion j 

 and I 'was happy to find it confirmed by the excellent 

 and judicious Dr. Henry More, whofe fentiments on 

 this fubject were pointed out to me by a friend. " It is 

 true (fays he) we cannot otherwife think of God's fore- 

 knowledge , but as being every way clear and perfect, 

 and without poffibility of error, as to thofe objects 



about 



