Chap. 2.] Divine Preference. 513 



about which he judges or pronounces. And furely he 

 does always judge and determine of things according as 

 they are \ that is to fay, of a contingent thing, as it is 

 contingent ; and of a neceflary thing as it is neceflary. 

 Whence it comes to pafs, that thofe things which are 

 contingent and proceed from a free principle of acting, 

 are allowed to be feen by God's confent. 



" But, not to confine God's omnifdence within nar- 

 rower, nor afcribe to it wider bounds than we do to his 

 omnipotence, which all fuppofe to be an ability to do 

 whatever implies not a contradiction ; let us difpatch 

 the difficulty in a few words, by faying, that the fore- 

 knowledge of contingent effeRs, which proceed from a 

 free -principle of affing, does either imply a contradic- ^ 

 tion, or it does not. If it does imply a contra- ; 

 diction, then fuch effects are not the object of God's 

 omnifdence y nor determined by it, nor rightly fuppofed 

 to be determined at all. But if it does not imply a 

 contradiction, then we actually confefs, that divine pre~ 

 Jcicnce, and bitman freewill, are not inconfiftent, but that 

 they may (land together." 



The mod decifive argument, however, againft the 

 fatalifts, is, the extravagant conclufions to which this 

 gloonay and comfordefs doctrine leads, and the horrible 

 confequences which are attached to it. If man is a 

 neteffary agent, he cannot poffibly be an accountable 

 being; for how prepofterous is the thought, how in- 

 confiftent would it be with every principle of juftice, 

 to punifti any being whatever, or in any degree, for 

 what he could not have avoided ? In a theological 

 view, therefore, this doctrine appears to conduct di- 

 rectly to atheifm ; for we cannot conceive of the Deity 

 in fuch a manner as to fuppofe him wantonly cruel or 

 unjuft. To fay that future puniihments are not to be 

 (as the orthodox party conceive) eternal in their dura- 

 tion, does not remove the difficulty j to puni(h at alt 



VOL. III. L I for 



