THE HUMAN WILL 



demonstrating that my will is free, I am simply 

 returning the (alleged) woman's reason for doing 

 a thing, "Just because," which is no answer in her 

 case or mine. 



But without admitting that this case, as it stands, 

 involves no moral considerations, let us take an 

 obviously moral issue, since that is the sphere in 

 which the free-will question is supposed to be of 

 importance. Let us suppose that I have promised 

 my wife to finish this chapter to-night, and so I 

 feel that I ought to do so. If I keep my word, de- 

 spite the temptation to be lazy, and despite the 

 perfect feasibility of deceiving my wife, why do I ? 

 Here it looks as if I were free, because the de- 

 termining cause is not external, but within myself. 

 The case is a subtler one. But I think Schopen- 

 hauer has fairly explained it. If I keep my word, 

 it might well be hazarded by a looker-on that I 

 have frequently kept my word before. I have a 

 self-observed norm, at which I endeavor to main- 

 tain myself. My experience of myself is that I 

 usually keep my promises, and I do not mean to 

 fall below my own level now. In such a case a 

 man is indeed self-determined, to use the liber- 

 tarian term; but it is obvious that we must now 

 inquire what has gone to the making of the self or 

 norm which I take as my standard. Nor does it 

 need much consideration to show that my habit of 

 promise-keeping, in such a case, could certainly be 

 referred either to heredity or environment or both. 



Perhaps this instance may serve to show that 

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