XXXI 



THE UNKNOWABLE 



SPENCER was not primarily an ontologist. His 

 philosophy, designed to deal with phenomena, was 

 not at first intended to include any ultimate con- 

 siderations. The section upon the unknowable 

 was not included as a basis for the rest of the 

 philosophy, which, as a unification of our phenom- 

 enal knowledge, is independent of any statement 

 of an ontological position, just as is the law of 

 gravitation. But it was very wisely pointed out 

 to Spencer that, in the absence of any statement 

 as to his ultimate beliefs, misconception would arise. 

 It would naturally be supposed that he imagined 

 his description of phenomena to be a description 

 of reality. He would, indeed, be accused of being 

 a materialist. The section upon the unknowable 

 was therefore included, in the very natural ex- 

 pectation that it would remove all misconception 

 and leave him free to develop his philosophy of 

 phenomena without let or hinderance from the 

 ontologists. This, however, was an entire mis- 

 calculation. Despite the unequivocal assertions 

 of this section and their frequent repetition and 

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