KNOWLEDGE OP THE UNKNOWABLE 



ther, the philosophical conception of time renders 

 meaningless the crude popular notion of creation, 

 which is merely a pseud-idea. If, then, its phe- 

 nomena are uncreated and eternal, so is reality. 

 This we may properly predicate of it, though we 

 continue to call it unknowable. 



Hitherto we have not reached any conclusions 

 that have more than a purely intellectual and im- 

 personal interest. If, indeed, it be possible to as- 

 sert of reality that it is one, uncreated and eternal, 

 we may be impressed and even awed ; but we have 

 said nothing that even remotely affects human life 

 and human action. As I see it, the implacable 

 fact is that the more poignant and practical the 

 questions we put, the less certain is the answer. 

 Thus of these three attributes there can surely be 

 no question whatever ; but henceforth doubt seems 

 to creep in. 



To make any assertion about the unknowable is 

 surely to assert that it is, in some measure, in- 

 telligible, and therefore in intimate relation with 

 our intelligences. Is it not, indeed, the "infinite 

 and eternal energy from which all things pro- 

 ceed " that "wells up % in ourselves in the form 

 of consciousness"? a belief which seems to im- 

 ply that, at least, the unknowable is semi-intel- 

 ligible or partially knowable. We may conclude, 

 then, that the eternal is, in a limited sense, intel- 

 ligible. 



To assert the existence of mind is surely to assert 

 that there is an intelligence at the heart of things. 

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