KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNKNOWABLE 



that when we speak of benevolence we are in the 

 chains of anthropomorphism. The mystics assure 

 us that their ecstatic visions show them love as 

 the supreme attribute of the Supreme. Yet this 

 question, on which the witnesses differ, is of more 

 import to us, hearing each other groan, than any 

 on which they agree. Indeed, while none of the 

 more or less certain conclusions to which we may 

 be led by consideration of phenomena and infer- 

 ence from them as to the nature of the unknowable, 

 are of any appreciable, practical import to us, it 

 is this last question the answer to which is vital. 

 From our present point of view no answer is pos- 

 sible, because the question is meaningless, apart 

 from the fact that it involves a palpably anthro- 

 pomorphic assumption. Furthermore, even the 

 answers given by philosophers of the past are 

 meaningless. Leibnitz declared that this was the 

 best of all possible worlds, not meaning thereby, 

 as is sometimes thought, that no better could be 

 conceived, but that the circumstances of existence 

 did not admit of things being better than they are. 

 The less ambiguous rendering of his meaning 

 would be not "the best of all possible worlds," but 

 "the best world possible." In the light of the 

 evolutionary explanation of the problem of evil, 

 even this ceases to have a meaning, for the world is 

 better now than it was in the time of Leibnitz, and 

 will assuredly be better yet. As far as I can see, 

 the answer of the evolutionary philosophy to the 

 question whether the unknowable is benevolent 

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